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ATTY. ROMEO B. IGOT v. CA

This case has been cited 5 times or more.

	GR No. 192649 2011-06-22	HOME GUARANTY CORPORATION v. R-II BUILDERS INC. PEREZ, J.
In De Leon v. Court of Appeals, [8] this Court had, of course, ruled that a case for rescission or annulment of contract is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation although it may eventually result in the recovery of real property. Taking into consideration the allegations and the nature of the relief sought in the complaint in the subsequent case of Serrano v. Delica, [9] however, this Court determined the existence of a real action and ordered the payment of the appropriate docket fees for a complaint for cancellation of sale which prayed for both permanent and preliminary injunction aimed at the restoration of possession of the land in litigation is a real action. In discounting the apparent conflict in said rulings, the Court went on to rule as follows in Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation v. Hon. Pablo C, Formaran, [10] to wit: The Court x x x does not perceive a contradiction between Serrano and the Spouses De Leon. The Court calls attention to the following statement in Spouses De Leon: "A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought." Necessarily, the determination must be done on a case-to-case basis, depending on the facts and circumstances of each. What petitioner conveniently ignores is that in Spouses De Leon, the action therein that private respondents instituted before the RTC was "solely for annulment or rescission" of the contract of sale over a real property. There appeared to be no transfer of title or possession to the adverse party x x x. (Underscoring Supplied)
	GR No. 192649 2011-03-09	HOME GUARANTY CORPORATION v. R-II BUILDERS INC. PEREZ, J.
We find that, having squarely raised the matter in its Rule 65 petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 111153,[48] HGC correctly faults the CA for not finding that Branch 24 of the Manila RTC had no authority to order the transfer of the case to respondent RTC.[49] Being outside the jurisdiction of Special Commercial Courts, the rule is settled that cases which are civil in nature, like the one commenced by R-II Builders, should be threshed out in a regular court.[50] With its acknowledged lack of jurisdiction over the case, Branch 24 of the Manila RTC should have ordered the dismissal of the complaint, since a court without subject matter jurisdiction cannot transfer the case to another court.[51] Instead, it should have simply ordered the dismissal of the complaint, considering that the affirmative defenses for which HGC sought hearing included its lack of jurisdiction over the case.
	GR NO. 173290 2006-11-20	ZENAIDA M. LIMBONA v. JUDGE RALPH S. LEE OF RTC-QUEZON CITY YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
The charge must be filed before the court against which the indirect contempt was committed.[23] Respondents' contention that the petition should be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds because indirect contempt proceedings involve a full-blown trial which can only be had before the trial court lacks merit. It is a well-established rule that the power to determine the existence of contempt of court rests exclusively with the court contemned.[24]
	GR NO. 143442 2006-08-29	PLACIDO O. URBANES v. LOCAL WATER UTILITIES ADMINISTRATION CARPIO MORALES, J.
The court that granted the preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order preserving the status quo is vested with the power to hear and determine the sufficiency and merit of the contempt charge. Only the court which issued the injunction can impose a sanction for contempt of that injunction, and a court without subject matter jurisdiction cannot transfer the case to another court.[20](Emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics in the original),
	GR NO. 146006 2005-04-22	JOSE C. LEE v. RTC OF QUEZON CITY CORONA, J.
The rationale that is usually advanced for the general rule ... is that, contempt proceedings are sui generis and are triable only by the court against whose authority the contempts are charged; the power to punish for contempt exists for the purpose of enabling a court to compel due decorum and respect in its presence and due obedience to its judgments, orders and processes and in order that a court may compel obedience to its orders, it must have the right to inquire whether there has been any disobedience thereof, for to submit the question of disobedience to another tribunal would operate to deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency.[13]