This case has been cited 11 times or more.
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2014-08-06 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Likewise, the Court agrees that the prosecution's reliance on the supposed loan documents, subsidiary ledgers, deposit slip, cash proof, RTCOCI and other documents was proper. They are both public and private documents which may be received in evidence; notably, petitioner's documentary evidence was admitted in full by the trial court.[68] With respect to evidence consisting of private documents, the presumption remains that "the recording of private transactions has been fair and regular, and that the ordinary course of business has been followed."[69] | |||||
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2013-04-10 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| It is now settled that an escalation clause is void where the creditor unilaterally determines and imposes an increase in the stipulated rate of interest without the express conformity of the debtor. Such unbridled right given to creditors to adjust the interest independently and upwardly would completely take away from the debtors the right to assent to an important modification in their agreement and would also negate the element of mutuality in their contracts.[34] While a ceiling on interest rates under the Usury Law was already lifted under Central Bank Circular No. 905, nothing therein "grants lenders carte blanche authority to raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets."[35] | |||||
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2010-06-18 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| After the foreclosure of the mortgaged property, the mortgage is extinguished and the purchaser at auction sale acquires the property free from such mortgage.[26] Any deficiency amount after foreclosure cannot constitute a continuing lien on the foreclosed property, but must be collected by the mortgagee-creditor in an ordinary action for collection. In this case, the second loan from the same mortgage deed is in the nature of a deficiency amount after foreclosure. | |||||
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2008-09-25 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari before this Court as we are not a trier of facts. Our jurisdiction in such a proceeding is limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts. Consequently, findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive, and cannot be reviewed on appeal.[27] It is not the function of this Court to reexamine or reevaluate evidence, whether testimonial or documentary, adduced by the parties in the proceedings below.[28] The preceding rule however, admits of certain exceptions and has, in the past, been relaxed when the lower courts' findings were not supported by the evidence on record or were based on a misapprehension of facts,[29] or when certain relevant and undisputed facts were manifestly overlooked that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[30] | |||||
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2007-09-03 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| In order that obligations arising from contracts may have the force of law between the parties, there must be mutuality between the parties based on their essential equality. A contract containing a condition which makes its fulfillment dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled will of one of the contracting parties, is void (Garcia v. Rita Legarda, Inc., 21 SCRA 555). Hence, even assuming that the P1.8 million loan agreement between the PNB and the private respondent gave the PNB a license (although in fact there was none) to increase the interest rate at will during the term of the loan, that license would have been null and void for being violative of the principle of mutuality essential in contracts. It would have invested the loan agreement with the character of a contract of adhesion, where the parties do not bargain on equal footing, the weaker party's (the debtor) participation being reduced to the alternative "to take it or leave it" (Qua v. Law Union & Rock Insurance Co., 95 Phil. 85). Such a contract is a veritable trap for the weaker party whom the courts of justice must protect against abuse and imposition. In New Sampaguita Builders Construction, Inc. (NSBCI) v. Philippine National Bank,[8] we ruled that while it is true that escalation clauses are valid in maintaining fiscal stability and retaining the value of money on long term contracts, however, giving respondent an unbridled right to adjust the interest independently and upwardly would completely take away from petitioner the right to assent to an important modification in their agreement, hence, would negate the element of mutuality in their contracts. Such escalation clause would make the fulfillment of the contracts dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled will of respondent bank and is therefore void. In the present case, the promissory note gives respondent bank authority to increase the interest rate at will during the term of the loan. This stipulation violates the principle of mutuality between the parties. It would be converting the loan agreement into a contract of adhesion where the parties do not bargain on equal footing, the weaker party's (petitioner's) participation being reduced to the alternative "to take it or leave it.[9] While the Usury Law ceiling on interest rate was lifted by Central Bank Circular No. 905, nothing therein could possibly be read as granting respondent bank carte blanche authority to raise interest rate to levels which would either enslave its borrower (petitioner herein) or lead to hemorrhaging of his assets.[10] | |||||
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2006-06-30 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| Prefatorily, it bears stressing that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This Court is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction in such a proceeding being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts. Consequently, findings of fact of the trial court and the CA are final and conclusive, and cannot be reviewed on appeal.[31] It is not the function of the Court to reexamine or reevaluate evidence, whether testimonial or documentary, adduced by the parties in the proceedings below.[32] Nevertheless, the rule admits of certain exceptions and has, in the past, been relaxed when the lower courts' findings were not supported by the evidence on record or were based on a misapprehension of facts,[33] or when certain relevant and undisputed facts were manifestly overlooked that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[34] | |||||
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2006-03-28 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| At the outset, it must be pointed out that the essential issue raised in this Petition the presence of fraud is factual. As a general rule, this Court does not review factual matters, as only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court. And as the Court has consistently held, factual findings of trial courts, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive on this Court,[7] save when the judgment of the appellate court is based on a misapprehension of facts or factual inferences manifestly incorrect or when that court overlooked certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[8] Obviously, petitioner is invoking these exceptions toward having the Court review the factual determinations of the CA. | |||||
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2005-03-16 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Clearly, these issues are factual in nature, which the Court, as a rule, should not have considered in this case. However, there are recognized exceptions, e.g., when the factual inferences of the appellate court are manifestly mistaken; the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; or the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different legal conclusion.[40] The present cases fall under the above exceptions. | |||||
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2004-09-23 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS ALREADY BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION AND OR LACHES.[19] Before going into the merits of the petition, the Court finds it necessary to reiterate the well-settled rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as "the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts."[20] It is not our function to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented.[21] | |||||
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2004-09-09 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| Indeed, "only questions of law[105] may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court."[106] Questions of fact cannot be the subject of this mode of appeal,[107] for this Court --we have repeatedly emphasized -- is "not a trier of facts."[108] One of the exceptions to this rule, however, is when the factual findings of the CA and the trial court are contradictory.[109] | |||||