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FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES v. MARIETTA J. HOMENA-VALENCIA

This case has been cited 4 times or more.

	GR No. 177711 2012-09-05	SUICO INDUSTRIAL CORP. v. MARILYN LAGURA-YAP REYES, J.
The retroactivity of the Neypes ruling was further explained in our Resolution dated June 25, 2008 in Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Homena Valencia,[25] wherein we held: The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period" rule announced in Neypes could retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was promulgated. That question may be answered with the guidance of the general rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure. Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing.
	GR No. 154213 2012-08-23	EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MARITIME LTD. v. ESTANISLAO SURIO BERSAMIN, J.
Republic Act No. 8042 applies to petitioners' complaint by virtue of the case being then still pending or undetermined at the time of the law's passage, there being no vested rights in rules of procedure.[11] They could not validly insist that the reckoning period to ascertain which law or rule should apply was the time when the disciplinary complaint was originally filed in the POEA in 1993. Moreover, Republic Act No. 8042 and its implementing rules and regulations were already in effect when petitioners took their appeal. A statute that eliminates the right to appeal and considers the judgment rendered final and unappealable only destroys the right to appeal, but not the right to prosecute an appeal that has been perfected prior to its passage, for, at that stage, the right to appeal has already vested and cannot be impaired.[12] Conversely and by analogy, an appeal that is perfected when a new statute affecting appellate jurisdiction comes into effect should comply with the provisions of the new law, unless otherwise provided by the new law. Relevantly, petitioners need to be reminded that the right to appeal from a decision is a privilege established by positive laws, which, upon authorizing the taking of the appeal, point out the cases in which it is proper to present the appeal, the procedure to be observed, and the courts by which the appeal is to be proceeded with and resolved.[13] This is why we consistently hold that the right to appeal is statutory in character, and is available only if granted by law or statute.[14]
	GR No. 173038 2011-09-14	ELENA JANE DUARTE v. MIGUEL SAMUEL A.E. DURAN DEL CASTILLO, J.
To standardize the appeal periods and afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, we ruled in Neypes v. Court of Appeals[56] that litigants must be given a fresh period of 15 days within which to appeal, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration under Rules 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45 of the Rules of Court.[57] This ruling, as we have said in Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Homena-Valencia,[58] retroactively applies even to cases pending prior to the promulgation of Neypes on September 14, 2005, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure.[59]
	GR No. 162518 2009-08-19	RODRIGO SUMIRAN v. SPS. GENEROSO DAMASO AND EVA DAMASO PERALTA, J.
The retroactivity of the Neypes rule in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to the date of promulgation of Neypes on September 14, 2005, was clearly explained by the Court in Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Homena-Valencia,[8] stating thus: The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period" rule announced in Neypes could retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was promulgated. That question may be answered with the guidance of the general rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure. Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing.