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RICARDO S. INDING v. SANDIGANBAYAN

This case has been cited 5 times or more.

	GR No. 167330 2009-09-18	PHILIPPINE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS v. CIR CORONA, J.
It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that no word, clause, sentence, provision or part of a statute shall be considered surplusage or superfluous, meaningless, void and insignificant. To this end, a construction which renders every word operative is preferred over that which makes some words idle and nugatory.[17] This principle is expressed in the maxim Ut magis valeat quam pereat, that is, we choose the interpretation which gives effect to the whole of the statute - its every word.[18]
	GR No. 167304 2009-08-25	PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN PERALTA, J.
In claiming that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case in question, petitioner disputes the former's appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan.[7] According to petitioner, Inding did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section (a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, which was made applicable to cases concerning violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in relation to public office.
	GR NO. 160528 2006-10-09	CIR v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES PANGANIBAN, CJ
The Court is bound to effectuate the lawmakers' intent, which is the controlling factor in interpreting a statute.[29] Significantly, this Court has held that the soul of the law is intent: "The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature."[30] While the Court recognizes the general rule that the grant of tax exemptions is strictly construed against the taxpayer and in favor of the taxing power,[31] Section 13 of the franchise of respondent leaves no room for interpretation. Its franchise exempts it from paying any tax other than the option it chooses: either the "basic corporate income tax" or the two percent gross revenue tax.
	GR NOS. 169727-28 2006-08-18	BRIG. GEN. JOSE S. RAMISCAL v. SANDIGANBAYAN CALLEJO, SR., J.
Petitioner avers that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crimes charged as provided in Section 4 of R.A. 8249. He insists that the AFP-RSBS is not a government-owned or controlled corporation and that he does not fall under Salary Grade 27 as required in Section 4 of the law, inasmuch as his position as AFP-RSBS President is not even included under the Compensation and Classification Act of 1989. Petitioner cites the ruling of this Court in Inding v. Sandiganbayan[31] to support his claim.
	GR NOS. 161784-86 2005-04-26	DINAH C. BARRIGA v. SANDIGANBAYAN CALLEJO, SR., J.
Rep. Act No. 8249,[13] which amended Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, provides, inter alia, that the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over crimes and felonies committed by public officers and employees, at least one of whom belongs to any of the five categories thereunder enumerated at the time of the commission of such crimes.[14] There are two classes of public office-related crimes under subparagraph (b) of Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249: first, those crimes or felonies in which the public office is a constituent element as defined by statute and the relation between the crime and the offense is such that, in a legal sense, the offense committed cannot exist without the office;[15] second, such offenses or felonies which are intimately connected with the public office and are perpetrated by the public officer or employee while in the performance of his official functions, through improper or irregular conduct.[16]