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BERNABE FOSTER-GALLEGO v. SPS. ROMEO AND VIVIEN GALANG

This case has been cited 7 times or more.

	GR No. 159788 2009-12-23	SOTERO ROY LEONERO v. SPS. MARCELINO B. BARBA PERALTA, J.
From such allegations, it is already clear that petitioners' action cannot succeed. Firstly, Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree provides that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can only be altered, modified or cancelled in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. In Foster-Gallego v. Galang,[7] the Court held that the issue of whether a title was procured by falsification or fraud should be raised in an action expressly instituted for the purpose, not in an action for quieting of title.[8] Again, in Vda. de Gualberto v. Go,[9] the Court held that the validity of a certificate of title cannot be assailed in an action for quieting of title; an action for annulment of title is the more appropriate remedy to seek the cancellation of a certificate of title.[10] Hence, herein petitioners' action for quieting of title is a mere collateral attack against respondents' TCT Nos. 59721, 59725, 59726 and 59727, and is proscribed by the law.
	GR No. 183105 2009-07-22	ERNA CASALS v. TAYUD GOLF PERALTA, J.
Based on the above premise, the CA correctly ruled that respondent Tayud Golf was an indispensable party to the original action. However, petitioners claim otherwise. Again, they claim that the parcels of land included in the assailed Orders and Writ are distinct and separate from those claimed by respondent Tayud Golf. What the petitioners fail to state, in simple terms, is that the assailed Orders and Writ would not have come into fruition if not for their original complaint, which sought to nullify the Affidavit of Quitclaim and Waiver. As discussed earlier, the properties of respondent Tayud Golf were included in the same Affidavit of Quitclaim and Waiver; hence, its interest in the said properties will surely be affected by the outcome of the case. Again, this Court reiterates that an indispensable party is one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made in his absence without injuring or affecting that interest.[42] As such, it is apparent that respondent Tayud Golf is indeed an indispensable party.
	GR No. 176409 2008-02-27	OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. ROLANDO S. MIEDES AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Under the rules on intervention, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.[14] Discretion is a faculty of a court or an official by which he may decide a question either way, and still be right.[15] The permissive tenor of the rules shows an intention to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the intervention. The discretion of the court, once exercised, cannot be reviewed by certiorari or controlled by mandamus save in instances where such discretion has been so exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner.[16]
	GR No. 169454 2007-12-27	DORONIO v. HEIRS OF FORTUNATO DORONIO REYES, R.T., J.
x x x In the said case or Petition No. U-920, notices were posted on the bulletin boards of barangay Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and Lingayen, Pangasinan, so that there was a notice to the whole world and during the initial hearing and/or hearings, no one interposed objection thereto.[54] Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking, in personam, but being against the person in respect of the res, these proceedings are characterized as quasi in rem.[55] The judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.[56] Thus, respondents are not bound by the decision in Petition Case No. U-920 as they were not made parties in the said case.
	GR NO. 163340 2007-11-23	HERMENEGILDA DE LA CRUZ LOYOLA v. ANASTACIO MENDOZA QUISUMBING, J.
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a purely statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. A party who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules.[29] Perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. Failure to interpose a timely appeal renders the assailed decision final and executory, and deprives a higher court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment or to entertain the appeal.[30] Not even this Court has jurisdiction to review, directly or indirectly, a final and executory decision of the lower court. Clearly, therefore, the Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction when it took cognizance of respondent's appeal and modified the trial court's final and executory decision.
	GR NO. 155785 2007-04-13	SIMPLICIO GALICIA v. LOURDES MANLIQUEZ VDA. DE MINDO AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
It is true that the allowance and disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court hearing the case.[7] However, jurisprudence is replete with cases wherein the Court ruled that a motion to intervene may be entertained or allowed even if filed after judgment was rendered by the trial court, especially in cases where the intervenors are indispensable parties.[8] In Pinlac v. Court of Appeals, this Court held:The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure, is intended to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive adjudication of rival claims overriding technicalities on the timeliness of the filing thereof. Indeed, in exceptional cases, the Court has allowed intervention notwithstanding the rendition of judgment by the trial court.[9] Since it is not disputed that herein respondents are compulsory heirs of Ines who stand to be affected by the judgment of the trial court, the latter should have granted their Motion to Intervene and should have admitted their Answer-in-Intervention.
	GR NO. 150986 2007-03-02	CLARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. MONDRAGON LEISURE VELASCO, JR., J.
The vexation to the courts in this case is evident. There is a high risk of conflict between the decisions of the RTC Branches 58 and 60 regarding their respective civil cases. A decision by one branch of court will constitute res judicata in the other case pending before the other branch of court. Alternatively, if the RTC Branch 60 exercised its jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief, then it would have to restrain the execution proceedings in the RTC Branch 58. Thus, interference with the proceedings in another court would ensue. Under the doctrine of non-interference, "a trial court has no authority to interfere with the proceedings of a court of equal jurisdiction, much less to annul the final judgment of a co-equal court."[30] In Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we declared that a court has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution proceedings in another court with concurrent jurisdiction.[31]