This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2014-07-01 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| In ascertaining the meaning of savings, certain principles should be borne in mind. The first principle is that Congress wields the power of the purse. Congress decides how the budget will be spent; what PAPs to fund; and the amounts of money to be spent for each PAP. The second principle is that the Executive, as the department of the Government tasked to enforce the laws, is expected to faithfully execute the GAA and to spend the budget in accordance with the provisions of the GAA.[149] The Executive is expected to faithfully implement the PAPs for which Congress allocated funds, and to limit the expenditures within the allocations, unless exigencies result to deficiencies for which augmentation is authorized, subject to the conditions provided by law. The third principle is that in making the President's power to augment operative under the GAA, Congress recognizes the need for flexibility in budget execution. In so doing, Congress diminishes its own power of the purse, for it delegates a fraction of its power to the Executive. But Congress does not thereby allow the Executive to override its authority over the purse as to let the Executive exceed its delegated authority. And the fourth principle is that savings should be actual. "Actual" denotes something that is real or substantial, or something that exists presently in fact, as opposed to something that is merely theoretical, possible, potential or hypothetical.[150] | |||||
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2013-11-19 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| In 1994,[30] 1995,[31] and 1996,[32] the GAAs contained the same provisions on project identification and fund release as found in the 1993 CDF Article. In addition, however, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was directed to submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations on the releases made from the funds.[33] | |||||
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2013-01-29 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Thus, the COA is generally accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its constitutional duty and responsibility to examine and audit expenditures of public funds, particularly those which are perceptibly beyond what is sanctioned by law. Verily, the Court has sustained the decisions of administrative authorities like the COA as a matter of general policy, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also upon the recognition that such administrative authorities held the expertise as to the laws they are entrusted to enforce.[21] The Court has accorded not only respect but also finality to their findings especially when their decisions are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion.[22] | |||||
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2012-02-07 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| We stress anew that it is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. [14] Findings of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the COA, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence, [15] and the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. [16] | |||||
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2010-04-23 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| In light of these express provisions of law granting respondent COA its power and authority, we have previously ruled that its exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that give life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government.[20] Furthermore, we have also declared that COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds.[21] | |||||