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SPS. RICARDO AND LEONILA DE LOS SANTOS v. MA. SOCORRO V. VDA. DE MANGUBAT

This case has been cited 10 times or more.

	GR No. 187836 2014-11-25	SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY OFFICERS v. ALFREDO S. LIM PEREZ, J.
Petitioners may argue that their petitions were filed ahead of the promulgation of the rules of procedure for environmental cases. However, procedural rules are generally given retroactive effect since there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.[144]
	GR No. 177711 2012-09-05	SUICO INDUSTRIAL CORP. v. MARILYN LAGURA-YAP REYES, J.
Thus, in similar cases decided by this Court after Neypes, the fresh period rule was applied, thereby allowing appellants who had filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration the full fifteen (15)-day period from receipt of the resolution resolving the motion within which to file a notice of appeal. Among these cases is Sumiran v. Damaso,[21] wherein we reiterated our ruling in Makati Insurance Co., Inc. v. Reyes[22] and De Los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat[23] to explain that the rule can be applied to actions pending upon its effectivity: As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared in Neypes v. Court of Appeals that by virtue of the power of the Supreme Court to amend, repeal and create new procedural rules in all courts, the Court is allowing a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. This would standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. x x x
	GR No. 171182 2012-08-23	UNIVERSITY OF PHILIPPINES v. AGUSTIN S. DIZON BERSAMIN, J.
It is cogent to add in this regard that to deny the benefit of the fresh- period rule to the UP would amount to injustice and absurdity injustice, because the judgment in question was issued on November 28, 2001 as compared to the judgment in Neypes that was rendered in 1998; absurdity, because parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders issued in the year 1998 would enjoy the benefit of the fresh-period rule but the later rulings of the lower courts like that herein would not.[105]
	GR No. 154213 2012-08-23	EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MARITIME LTD. v. ESTANISLAO SURIO BERSAMIN, J.
Petitioners' position that Republic Act No. 8042 should not be applied retroactively to the review of the POEA's decision dismissing their complaint against respondents has no support in jurisprudence. Although, as a rule, all laws are prospective in application unless the contrary is expressly provided,[8] or unless the law is procedural or curative in nature,[9] there is no serious question about the retroactive applicability of Republic Act No. 8042 to the appeal of the POEA's decision on petitioners' disciplinary action against respondents. In a way, Republic Act No. 8042 was a procedural law due to its providing or omitting guidelines on appeal. A law is procedural, according to De Los Santos v. Vda. De Mangubat,[10] when it
	GR No. 166738 2009-08-14	ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA v. EDWARD RUMBAUA BRION, J.
The amendment introduced under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is procedural or remedial in character; it does not create or remove any vested right, but only operates as a remedy in aid of or confirmation of already existing rights. The settled rule is that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect,[25] as we held in De Los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat:[26]
	GR No. 156302 2009-04-07	HEIRS OF GEORGE Y. POE v. MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In De los Santos v. Vda de Mangubat,[47] particularly, the Court applied the fresh period rule, elucidating that procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes. The fresh period rule is irrefragably procedural, prescribing the manner in which the appropriate period for appeal is to be computed or determined and, therefore, can be made applicable to actions pending upon its effectivity without danger of violating anyone else's rights.
	GR No. 152150 2008-12-10	SPS. REYNALDO O. PADUA AND IRENE C. PADUA AND GLADYS C. PADUA v. CA QUISUMBING, J.
The fresh 15-day period rule applies to the present case as it was pending and undecided when the ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals was promulgated. We have consistently held that rules of procedure may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage without violating the right of a party-litigant since there is no vested right in rules of procedure.[22]
	GR No. 167403 2008-08-06	MAKATI INSURANCE CO. v. WILFREDO D. REYES CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.[26] Hence, in the interest of substantial justice, procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms of compliance may be relaxed.[27]
	GR No. 173942 2008-06-25	FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES v. MARIETTA J. HOMENA-VALENCIA TINGA, J,
Most vitally, petitioners point out that on 10 October 2007, or just five (5) days before the promulgation of the assailed Decision, the Court through the Third Division rendered a decision in Sps. De los Santos v. Vda. De Mangubat[15] declaring that the Neypes ruling indeed can be retroactively applied to prior instances.