This case has been cited 6 times or more.
|
2014-04-22 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
||||
| First off, the Court must correct Alcaraz's mistaken notion: it is not the probationary employee's job description but the adequate performance of his duties and responsibilities which constitutes the inherent and implied standard for regularization. To echo the fundamental point of the Decision, if the probationary employee had been fully apprised by his employer of these duties and responsibilities, then basic knowledge and common sense dictate that he must adequately perform the same, else he fails to pass the probationary trial and may therefore be subject to termination.[8] | |||||
|
2012-04-25 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
||||
| WWWEC, however, excepts on the argument that it put Aliling on notice that he would be evaluated on the 3rd and 5th months of his probationary employment. To WWWEC, its efforts translate to sufficient compliance with the requirement that a probationary worker be apprised of the reasonable standards for his regularization. WWWEC invokes the ensuing holding in Alcira v. National Labor Relations Commission[31] to support its case: Conversely, an employer is deemed to substantially comply with the rule on notification of standards if he apprises the employee that he will be subjected to a performance evaluation on a particular date after his hiring. We agree with the labor arbiter when he ruled that: | |||||
|
2011-11-16 |
MENDOZA, J. |
||||
| Citing Alcira v. NLRC[12] and Colegio San Agustin v. NLRC,[13] the petitioners further argue that Sy's constitutional protection to security of tenure ended on the last day of her probationary tenure or on February 28, 2007. It is unfair to compel regularization of an employee who was found by the Management to be unfit for the job. As they were not under obligation to extend Sy's employment, there was no illegal dismissal, but merely an expiration of the probationary contract. As such, she was not entitled to any benefits like separation pay or backwages. | |||||
|
2011-11-16 |
MENDOZA, J. |
||||
| It is settled that even if probationary employees do not enjoy permanent status, they are accorded the constitutional protection of security of tenure. This means they may only be terminated for a just cause or when they otherwise fail to qualify as regular employees in accordance with reasonable standards made known to them by the employer at the time of their engagement.[16] Consistently, in Mercado v. AMA Computer College-Paranaque City, Inc.,[17] this Court clearly stressed that: Labor, for its part, is given the protection during the probationary period of knowing the company standards the new hires have to meet during the probationary period, and to be judged on the basis of these standards, aside from the usual standards applicable to employees after they achieve permanent status. Under the terms of the Labor Code, these standards should be made known to the [employees] on probationary status at the start of their probationary period, or xxx during which the probationary standards are to be applied. Of critical importance in invoking a failure to meet the probationary standards, is that the [employer] should show as a matter of due process how these standards have been applied. This is effectively the second notice in a dismissal situation that the law requires as a due process guarantee supporting the security of tenure provision, and is in furtherance, too, of the basic rule in employee dismissal that the employer carries the burden of justifying a dismissal. These rules ensure compliance with the limited security of tenure guarantee the law extends to probationary employees.[18] [Emphases supplied] | |||||
|
2011-11-16 |
MENDOZA, J. |
||||
| In its attempt to justify Sy's dismissal, the petitioners relied heavily on the case of Alcira v. NLRC[21] where the Court stressed that the constitutional protection ends on the expiration of the probationary period when the parties are free to either renew or terminate their contract of employment. | |||||
|
2006-09-12 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
||||
| While it is true that respondent was not furnished with the pink-colored set of regulations of petitioner Cathay and with copies of the staff assessment reports, nevertheless, respondent was briefed by Montallana on their contents. When Leviste inquired from respondent if he understood the rules and regulations, and if job specifications were clear to him, the latter responded in the affirmative.[57] Respondent admitted having received from petitioner Cathay copies of documents to be used to evaluate his performance. Petitioner thus complied with the statutory requirement.[58] | |||||