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SPS. MINIANO AND LETA DELA CRUZ v. CA AND SPS. ARCHIMEDES AND MARLYN AGUILA

This case has been cited 7 times or more.

	GR No. 158929 2010-08-03	ROSARIO P. TAN v. ARTEMIO G. RAMIREZ BRION, J.
In Ramnani v. Court of Appeals,[29] we held that the main purpose of a compromise agreement is to put an end to litigation because of the uncertainty that may arise from it. Reciprocal concessions are the very heart and life of every compromise agreement.[30] By the nature of a compromise agreement, it brings the parties to agree to something that neither of them may actually want, but for the peace it will bring them without a protracted litigation.[31]
	GR No. 164789 2009-08-27	CHRISTIAN GENERAL ASSEMBLY v. SPS. AVELINO C. IGNACIO AND PRISCILLA T. IGNACIO BRION, J.
Obviously, where it is not clear from the allegations in the complaint that the property involved is a subdivision lot, as in Javellana v. Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 30, Manila,[25] the case falls under the jurisdiction of the regular courts and not the HLURB. Similarly, in Spouses Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals,[26] we held that the RTC had jurisdiction over a case where the conflict involved a subdivision lot buyer and a party who owned a number of subdivision lots but was not himself the subdivision developer.
	GR No. 184081 2009-06-19	GLOBAL HOLIDAY OWNERSHIP CORPORATION v. METROPOLITAN BANK YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Taking from Wong, we must interpret Paragraph 14 of the parties' mortgage contract as one having been made for the benefit of the mortgagor, and one which Metrobank knowingly incorporated into the agreement. Having been in the business of banking since 1962 - or for more than forty years now - it certainly had the knowledge, experience and the resources to correct any perceived oversight it was guilty of making in the past with respect to its contracts. Although we do not view Paragraph 14 to be one such oversight; as we have declared in Wong, the purpose of said stipulation is benign: to apprise the mortgagor of any action which Metrobank might take on the subject property, thus according him the opportunity to safeguard his rights. We cannot allow Metrobank to disavow its solemn covenant with Global, to turn its back on a contract which it prepared on its own, without the intervention of the other party. A party should not, after having its opportunity to enjoy the benefits of an agreement, be allowed to later disown the arrangement when the terms thereof ultimately would prove to operate against its hopeful expectations.[12]
	GR No. 180394 2008-09-29	MARJORIE B. CADIMAS v. MARITES CARRION TINGA, J.
Not every controversy involving a subdivision or condominium unit falls under the competence of the HLURB[29] in the same way that the mere allegation of relationship between the parties, i.e., that of being subdivision owner/developer and subdivision lot buyer, does not automatically vest jurisdiction in the HLURB. For an action to fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB, the decisive element is the nature of the action as enumerated in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1344.[30] Notably, in Spouses Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals,[31] the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint for cancellation of the contract to sell of a subdivision house and lot because the case did not fall under any of the cases mentioned in Section 1, P.D. No. 1344. In interpreting said provision, the Court explained, thus:On this matter, we have consistently held that the concerned administrative agency, the National Housing Authority (NHA) before and now the HLURB, has jurisdiction over complaints aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations.
	GR NO. 159659 2006-10-16	RUBEN S. SIA v. PEOPLE QUISUMBING, J.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the court or agency is determined by the allegations in the complaint. It cannot be made to depend on the defenses made by the defendant in his Answer or Motion to Dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant.[12] The informations rest the cause of action on the petitioners' failure to register the Contracts to Sell in accordance with Section 17 of P.D. No. 957. The penalty imposable is a fine of not more than Twenty Thousand Pesos and/or imprisonment of not more than ten years.[13] Once again, clearly, the offense charged is well within the jurisdiction of the trial court.
	GR NO. 166421 2006-09-05	JOURNALISTS v. NLRC CALLEJO, SR., J.
To reiterate, the rule is that when judgment is rendered based on a compromise agreement, the judgment becomes immediately executory, there being an implied waiver of the parties' right to appeal from the decision.[43] The judgment having become final, the Court can no longer reverse, much less modify it.
	GR NO. 130982 2005-09-16	SPS. DOMINGO v. PIERRE ASTORGA
In sum, in the case at bar, petitioners pray for rescission of the Deed of Sale of the building and offer to repay the purchase price after their liquidity position would have improved and after respondents would have refurbished the building, updated the real property taxes, and turned the building into a profitable business venture. This Court, however, will not allow itself to be an instrument to the dissolution of contract validly entered into. A party should not, after its opportunity to enjoy the benefits of an agreement, be allowed to later disown the arrangement when the terms thereof ultimately would prove to operate against its hopeful expectations.[36]