This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2013-12-04 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Assuming for the sake of argument that the presumption of work-relation was refuted by petitioners, compensability may still be established on the basis of the theory of work aggravation if, by substantial evidence,[21] it can be demonstrated that the working conditions aggravated or at least contributed in the advancement of respondent's cancer.[22] As held in Rosario v. Denklav Marine,[23] "the burden is on the beneficiaries to show a reasonable connection between the causative circumstances in the employment of the deceased employee and his death or permanent total disability." | |||||
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2013-12-04 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| The above assertions of respondent do not constitute as substantial evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion that there is a causal relationship between his illness and the working conditions on board the petitioners' vessel. Although the Court has recognized as sufficient that work conditions are proven to have contributed even to a small degree,[28] such must, however, be reasonable, and anchored on credible information.[29] The claimant must, therefore, prove a convincing proposition other than by his mere allegations.[30] This he failed to do. | |||||
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2013-08-28 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| This approach to case disposition by the CA making factual findings based only on presumptions,[46] and absent the quantum of evidence required in labor cases[47] is an erroneous application of the law on compensation proceedings. As we have ruled in Gabunas, Sr. v. Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.,[48] citing Government Service Insurance System v. Cuntapay,[49] claimants in compensation proceedings must show credible information that there is probably a relation between the illness and the work. Probability, and not mere possibility, is required; otherwise, the resulting conclusion would proceed from deficient proofs.[50] Thus, since the CA crafted a legal conclusion out of conjectures and without substantial evidence, we rule that a reversible error of law attended its award of death benefits, minor child's allowance, and burial expenses. For this reason, we delete the grant thereof to respondent. | |||||
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2010-12-15 |
SERENO, J. |
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| We agree with petitioner's argument that to establish whether the illness is work-related, probability - not certainty - is the touchstone.[33] However, the probability referred to must be founded on facts and reason. Government Service Insurance System v. Emmanuel P. Cuntapay[34] is instructive as regards the burden resting on a claimant's shoulder - that of proving the causal link between a claimant's work and the ailment suffered: The claimant must show, at least, by substantial evidence that the development of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job. What the law requires is a reasonable work connection and not a direct causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable. Probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings. And probability must be reasonable; hence it should, at least, be anchored on credible information. Moreover, a mere possibility will not suffice; a claim will fail if there is only a possibility that the employment caused the disease. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.) | |||||
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2009-06-18 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Although the Court commiserates with petitioner's sufferings, the Court cannot close its eyes to the need to ensure that the workmen's trust fund is protected from depletion due to claims for illnesses which may not be truly work-related. Thus, the Court emphasizes once again its admonition in Government Service Insurance System v. Cuntapay,[14] to wit:x x x with prudence and judicial restraint, a tribunal's zeal in bestowing compassion should yield to the precept in administrative law that absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion, courts are loathe to interfere with and should respect the findings of quasi-judicial agencies in fields where they are deemed and held to be experts due to their special technical knowledge and training. Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens and millions of workers and their families look for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and deaths occur.[15] | |||||
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2009-05-21 |
PUNO, C.J. |
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| The degree of proof required under P.D. No. 626 is merely substantial evidence, or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."[22] We have repeatedly held that to prove compensability, the claimant must adequately show that the development of the disease is brought largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job.[23] What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation.[24] It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable.[25] Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection.[26] Probability, not certainty, is the touchstone. [27] | |||||