This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2015-09-01 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| The fact that the COMELEC division's decision may be referred to the en banc via a motion for reconsideration should in no way be considered as a diminution of its adjudicatory powers. Worth maintaining is this doctrine in Mendoza: a motion for reconsideration is a constitutionally guaranteed remedial mechanism for parties aggrieved by a division decision or resolution, but not an appeal.[37] In the same vein, it was held in Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals (Apo Fruits Corporation) that "[t]he Supreme Court sitting en banc is not an appellate court vis-a-vis its Divisions, and it exercises no appellate jurisdiction over the latter. Each division of the Court is considered not a body inferior to the Court en banc, and sits veritably as the Court en banc itself."[38] This particular doctrine in Mendoza and Apo Fruits Corporation should be understood to have strengthened, rather than rendered nugatory, the adjudicatory powers of the COMELEC's and that of the Court's divisions - that the decision of a division virtually amounts to a decision of the en banc and, as such, is potentially binding and conclusive on the parties. | |||||
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2010-03-25 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Thus, in order for a ballot to be considered marked, it must clearly appear that the marks or words found on the ballot were deliberately placed thereon to serve as identification marks which therefore invalidate it.[11] | |||||
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2009-08-14 |
BRION, J. |
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| The Constitution itself decrees that the Supreme Court can sit En Banc or in divisions of three, five, or seven members.[13] Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of the majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations of the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members.[14] Under SC Circular No. 2-89 (Guidelines and Rules in the Referral to the Court En Banc of Cases Assigned to a Division), a decision of a Division of the Court, when concurred in by a majority of its Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon, is a decision of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court sitting En Banc is not an appellate court in relation with the Divisions to which the latter's decisions may be appealed. Each division of the Court is not a body inferior to the Court En Banc, and sits veritably as the Court En Banc itself.[15] | |||||
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2009-06-25 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| In Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[46] we once more gave paramount importance to the criteria inscribed in Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 and the pertinent DAOs. In sustaining therein the valuation of the special agrarian court, we ratiocinated: [T]he Court affirmed the due consideration given by the RTC of the factors specified in Section 17, Republic Act No. 6657. Again, the proper valuation of the subject premises was reached with clear regard for the acquisition cost of the land, current market value of the properties, its nature, actual use and income, inter alia -- factors that are material and relevant in determining just compensation. These are the very same factors laid down in a formula by DAR A.O. No. 5. Due regard was thus given by the RTC to Republic Act No. 6657, DAR A.O. No. 5 and prevailing jurisprudence when it arrived at the value of just compensation due to AFC and HPI in this case. | |||||
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2009-03-13 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals[19] yet again accentuated the necessity of giving paramount importance to the criteria found in Section 17 of the agrarian law and the pertinent DAR administrative order. In affirming therein the special agrarian court's valuation, it reasoned in this fashion:[T]he Court affirmed the due consideration given by the RTC of the factors specified in Section 17, Republic Act No. 6657. Again, the proper valuation of the subject premises was reached with clear regard for the acquisition cost of the land, current market value of the properties, its nature, actual use and income, inter alia -- factors that are material and relevant in determining just compensation. These are the very same factors laid down in a formula by DAR A.O. No. 5. Due regard was thus given by the RTC to Republic Act No. 6657, DAR A.O. No. 5 and prevailing jurisprudence when it arrived at the value of just compensation due to AFC and HPI in this case. | |||||