This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2014-07-02 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Under Section 8[28] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1125, the CTA is categorically described as a court of record.[29] As such, it shall have the power to promulgate rules and regulations for the conduct of its business, and as may be needed, for the uniformity of decisions within its jurisdiction.[30] Moreover, as cases filed before it are litigated de novo, party-litigants shall prove every minute aspect of their cases.[31] Thus, no evidentiary value can be given the pieces of evidence submitted by the BIR, as the rules on documentary evidence require that these documents must be formally offered before the CTA.[32] Pertinent is Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which reads: SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. | |||||
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2010-09-01 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| We reiterated the above ruling in Dizon v. Court of Tax Appeals[47] where one of the issues presented was whether the Court of Tax Appeals and the CA gravely abused their discretion "in allowing the admission of the pieces of evidence which were not formally offered" by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.[48] In finding the case impressed with merit, the Court held that: Under Section 8 of RA 1125, the CTA is categorically described as a court of record. As cases filed before it are litigated de novo, party-litigants shall prove every minute aspect of their cases. Indubitably, no evidentiary value can be given the pieces of evidence submitted by the BIR, as the rules on documentary evidence require that these documents must be formally offered before the CTA. x x x | |||||
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2010-07-28 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| While the CTA is not governed strictly by technical rules of evidence on the principle that rules of procedure are not ends in themselves but are primarily intended as tools in the administration of justice,[46] respondent's presentation of evidence to prove the fraud which attended the issuance of the subject TCCs is not a mere procedural technicality which may be disregarded considering that it is the very basis for the claim that Petron's payment of its excise tax liabilities had been avoided. It cannot be over-emphasized that fraud is a question of fact[47] which cannot be presumed and must be proven by clear and convincing evidence[48] by the party alleging the same. Without even presenting the documents which served as bases for the issuance of the subject TCCs from 1994 to 1997, respondent miserably failed in discharging his evidentiary burden with the presentation of the Center's cancellation memoranda to which were simply annexed some of the grantees' original registration documents[49] and their Financial Statements for an average of two years.[50] | |||||