This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2015-02-09 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| After a careful evaluation of the records, we find that these elements were clearly met. The prosecution witnesses positively identified the appellant as the person who stabbed Pablo several times on the chest which eventually caused the latter's death. They testified that they even tried to stop appellant's attack but unfortunately, were unsuccessful. We find no reason to disbelieve the testimonies of these witnesses considering that their narration of facts were straightforward and replete with details that coincide with the medical examination conducted on the body of the victim. We are not persuaded by the appellant's defense of denial as this cannot prevail over the eyewitnesses' positive identification of him as the perpetrator of the crime. Denial, like alibi, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.[11] | |||||
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2013-01-16 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| First, prosecution witness Sit-Jar positively identified appellant as the victim's assailant in contrast to the appellant's defense of denial and alibi. We have stated in Malana v. People[23] that: It is elementary that alibi and denial are outweighed by positive identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter. Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. The prosecution witnesses positively identified appellants as two of the perpetrators of the crime. It is incumbent upon appellants to prove that they were at another place when the felony was committed, and that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. x x x. (Citations omitted.) | |||||
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2010-09-22 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| As the killing, in this case, is perpetrated with both treachery and by means of explosives, the latter shall be considered as a qualifying circumstance since it is the principal mode of attack. Reason dictates that this attendant circumstance should qualify the offense while treachery will be considered merely as a generic aggravating circumstance.[70] | |||||
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2008-10-06 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| In Malana v. People,[51] We convicted the accused of murder and ordered him to pay the victim the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 by way of moral damages. The same civil indemnity and moral damages were awarded by the Court to the heirs of the murdered victims in People v. Segobre,[52] People v. Ausa,[53] and in People v. Piliin.[54] | |||||