This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2010-06-29 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| On the other hand, respondents, in their Comment[23] filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that the trial court correctly denied the subject petition. Respondents maintain that while the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila had recommended that PO1 Ampatuan be released from custody, said recommendation was made only insofar as the criminal action for murder that was filed with the prosecution office is concerned and is without prejudice to other legal grounds for which he may be held under custody. In the instant case, PO1 Ampatuan is also facing administrative charges for Grave Misconduct. They cited the case of Manalo v. Calderon,[24] where this Court held that a petition for habeas corpus will be given due course only if it shows that petitioner is being detained or restrained of his liberty unlawfully, but a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.[25] | |||||
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2008-10-14 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| The present petitions fall squarely into these exceptions to thus thrust them into the domain of judicial review. The grounds cited above in David are just as applicable in the present cases as they were, not only in David, but also in Province of Batangas v. Romulo[100] and Manalo v. Calderon[101] where the Court similarly decided them on the merits, supervening events that would ordinarily have rendered the same moot notwithstanding. | |||||
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2008-10-14 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| By Resolution of August 4, 2008, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order commanding and directing public respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD.[13] The Court also required the Solicitor General to submit to the Court and petitioners the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD,[14] to which she complied.[15] | |||||
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2008-09-22 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| This is not a novel issue. In the recent Manalo v. Calderon,[27] this Court recognized that the Philippine National Police has an administrative disciplinary system distinct from that of ordinary agencies. Its personnel are different from ordinary civil service employees. We held then:Lastly, petitioners contend that by placing them under restrictive custody, they are made to suffer lesser rights than those enjoyed by private citizens. On this score, the Court's pronouncement in Canson, et al. v. Hidalgo, et al. is categorical. It was held there that although the PNP is civilian in character, its members are subject to the disciplinary authority of the Chief, Philippine National Police, under the National Police Commission. Courts cannot, by injunction, review, overrule, or otherwise interfere with valid acts of police officials. The police organization must observe self-discipline and obey a chain of command under civilian officials. | |||||
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2008-08-26 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| It is true that we have held in a number of cases that the moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts will still decide cases otherwise, moot and academic if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and, fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.[62] However, not one of the enumerated exceptions obtains in the instant case. Thus, a denial of the instant petition is warranted. | |||||