This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2012-12-05 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Time and again, we have ruled that self-serving and unsubstantiated declarations are insufficient to establish a case before quasi-judicial bodies where the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact is substantial evidence.[31] Often described as more than a mere scintilla,[32] substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise.[33] To our mind, Calawigan's unsubstantiated assertion that he requested for a post-employment medical examination from LISI does not even come close to approximating the foregoing quantum of proof. Given that compliance with said requirement is mandatory and the unexplained omission thereof will bar the filing of a claim for disability benefits,[34] the CA clearly erred when it adjudged Calawigan entitled to sickness allowance and permanent disability compensation despite his failure to abide by the procedure outlined under the POEA-SEC. As it would be fairly easy for a physician to determine whether the injury or ailment is work-related within three-days from repatriation, to ignore the requirement would set a precedent with negative repercussions which would open the floodgates to a limitless number of seafarers claiming disability benefits.[35] | |||||
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2012-03-07 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay.[37] Constructive dismissal is a dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not.[38] In constructive dismissal cases, the employer is, concededly, charged with the burden of proving that its conduct and action or the transfer of an employee are for valid and legitimate grounds such as genuine business necessity.[39] | |||||
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2011-11-21 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Neither may private respondent's refusal to report for work subsequent to the Labor Arbiter's issuance of an order for his reinstatement be considered as another abandonment of his job. It is a settled rule that failure to report for work after a notice to return to work has been served does not necessarily constitute abandonment.[19] As defined under established jurisprudence, abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment.[20] It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer.[21] For a valid finding of abandonment, these two factors should be present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship, with the second as the more determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employee has no more intention to work.[22] The intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified.[23] In the instant case, private respondent claimed that his subsequent refusal to report for work despite the Labor Arbiter's order for his reinstatement is due to the fact that he was subsequently made to perform the job of a "bodegero" of which he is unfamiliar and which is totally different from his previous task of "mastering tape." Moreover, he was assigned to a different workplace, which is a warehouse, where he was isolated from all other employees. The Court notes that petitioners failed to refute the foregoing claims of private respondent in their pleadings filed with the CA. It is only in their Reply filed with this Court that they simply denied and brushed off private respondent's assertion that he was made to work as a "bodegero." The Court is, thus, led to conclude that petitioners' failure to immediately refute the claims of private respondent is an implied admission thereof. In the same vein, the Court treats petitioners' belated denial of the same claims of private respondent as mere afterthought which is not worthy of credence. | |||||
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2011-08-03 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Viewed in the light of the foregoing factual antecedents, we find that the CA reversibly erred in holding petitioners liable for constructively dismissing Leynes from her employment. There is said to be constructive dismissal when an act of clear discrimination, insensitivity or disdain on the part of the employer has become so unbearable as to leave an employee with no choice but to forego continued employment.[41] Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay.[42] Stated otherwise, it is a dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not.[43] In constructive dismissal cases, the employer is, concededly, charged with the burden of proving that its conduct and action or the transfer of an employee are for valid and legitimate grounds such as genuine business necessity.[44]To our mind, respondents have more than amply discharged this burden with proof of the circumstances surrounding Engr. Carlos' employment as Property Manager for the Project and the consequent unavailability of a similar position for Leynes. | |||||
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2011-02-16 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| For abandonment to exist, it is essential (a) that the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and (b) that there must have been a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt acts.[29] The employer has the burden of proof to show the employee's deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume his employment without any intention of returning. Mere absence is not sufficient. There must be an unequivocal intent on the part of the employee to discontinue his employment.[30] | |||||
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2010-02-02 |
BRION, J. |
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| The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard; it is the denial of this opportunity that constitutes violation of due process of law. [36] The respondent was given the opportunity to be heard when a proper notice of investigation was sent to him, although the notice did not reach him for reasons outside the petitioner's control. He was not also totally unheard on the matter as he was able to explain his side through the two (2) explanation letters he submitted. These letters are clear indications that he intimately knew of the matter for which he was being investigated. If he was denied due process at all, the denial was with respect to the charges of extortion, tardiness and absenteeism, which are grounds invoked separately from loss of trust and confidence and which were not serious considerations in the dismissal that followed. We need not therefore consider these grounds as material to the present case. | |||||
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2009-12-23 |
BRION, J. |
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| The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to give up his position under the circumstances. It is an act amounting to dismissal but is made to appear as if it were not. In fact, the employee who is constructively dismissed might have been allowed to keep coming to work. Constructive dismissal is therefore a dismissal in disguise. The law recognizes and resolves this situation in favor of employees in order to protect their rights and interests from the coercive acts of the employer.[15] | |||||