This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2013-01-30 |
BRION, J. |
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| We agree that ownership carries the right of possession, but the possession contemplated by the concept of ownership is not exactly the same as the possession in issue in a forcible entry case. Possession in forcible entry suits refers only to possession de facto, or actual or material possession, and not possession flowing out of ownership; these are different legal concepts[36] for which the law provides different remedies for recovery of possession.[37] As we explained in Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals,[38] and again in the more recent cases of Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals,[39] De Grano v. Lacaba,[40] and Lagazo v. Soriano,[41] the word "possession" in forcible entry suits refers to nothing more than prior physical possession or possession de facto, not possession de jure[42] or legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law.[43] Title is not the issue,[44] and the absence of it "is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case."[45] | |||||
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2012-11-26 |
BRION, J. |
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| Because they only resolve issues of possession de facto, ejectment actions are summary in nature, while accion publiciana (for the recovery of possession) and accion reivindicatoria (for the recovery of ownership) are plenary actions.[48] The purpose of allowing actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer to be decided in summary proceedings is to provide for a peaceful, speedy and expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of property from unjustly taking and continuing his possession during the long period it would take to properly resolve the issue of possession de jure or ownership, thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace and order in the community; otherwise, the party illegally deprived of possession might take the law in his hands and seize the property by force and violence.[49] An ejectment case cannot be a substitute for a full-blown trial for the purpose of determining rights of possession or ownership. Citing Mediran v. Villanueva,[50] the Court in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals[51] describes in detail how these two remedies should be used: In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession; and in case of controverted right, it requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or the other of them sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. It is obviously just that the person who has first acquired possession should remain in possession pending [the] decision; and the parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in a petty warfare over the possession of the property which is the subject of dispute. To permit this would be highly dangerous to individual security and disturbing to social order. Therefore, where a person supposes himself to be the owner of a piece of property and desires to vindicate his ownership against the party actually in possession, it is incumbent upon him to institute an action to this end in a court of competent jurisdiction; and he [cannot] be permitted, by invading the property and excluding the actual possessor, to place upon the latter the burden of instituting an [action] to try the property right. [italics supplied] | |||||
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2009-06-16 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the complainant must allege and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the property and that he was deprived of such possession by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.[30] A party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain in the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him.[31] | |||||