Lawyerly

GR No. 209287

2014-07-01

MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO v. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III

BERSAMIN, J.

Legal standing, as a requisite for the exercise of judicial review, refers to "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."[43] The concept of legal standing, or locus standi, was particularly discussed in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council,[44] where the Court said: In public or constitutional litigations, the Court is often burdened with the determination of the locus standi of the petitioners due to the ever-present need to regulate the invocation of the intervention of the Court to correct any official action or policy in order to avoid obstructing the efficient functioning of public officials and offices involved in public service. It is required, therefore, that the petitioner must have a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, for, as indicated in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.:

GR No. 179267

2013-06-25

JESUS C. GARCIA v. GARCIA

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.[44] It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute,[45] "this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law."[46] The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs.[47] We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA[48] that, "[p]lainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows: SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

GR No. 202242

2013-04-16

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

MENDOZA, J.

It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair play. To reiterate the doctrine enunciated in Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation:[32]

GR No. 173425

2013-01-22

FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. CIR

DEL CASTILLO, J.

This resolves respondents' Motion for Reconsideration.[1] Respondents raise the following arguments: "1) Prior payment of tax is inherent in the nature and payment of the 8% transitional input tax;[2] 2) Revenue Regulations No. 7-95 providing for 8% transitional input tax based on the value of the improvements on the real properties is a valid legislative rule;[3] 3) For failure to clearly prove its entitlement to the transitional input tax credit, petitioner's claim for tax refund must fail in light of the basic doctrine that tax refund partakes of the nature of a tax exemption which should be construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer."[4]

GR No. 202242

2012-07-17

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

MENDOZA, J.

As to the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the JBC is unconstitutional, it bears mentioning that as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.[56] This rule, however, is not absolute. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation,[57] the Court explained: The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.

GR No. 171905

2012-06-20

UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN PHILIPPINES v. BRADFORD UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST

PEREZ, J.

The doctrine of locus standi or the right of appearance in a court of justice has been adequately discussed by this Court in a number of cases. The doctrine requires a litigant to have a material interest in the outcome of a case. In private suits, locus standi requires a litigant to be a "real party in interest," which is defined as "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."[51]

GR Nos. 147036-37

2012-04-10

-ORGANIZATIONS v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

ABAD, J.

Section 2 of P.D. 755, Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 961, and Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468 completely ignore the fact that coco-levy funds are public funds raised through taxation. And since taxes could be exacted only for a public purpose, they cannot be declared private properties of individuals although such individuals fall within a distinct group of persons.[65]

GR Nos. 177857-58

2012-01-24

PHILIPPINE COCONUT v. REPUBLIC

VELASCO JR., J.

We have ruled time and again that taxes are imposed only for a public purpose.[111] "They cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons."[112] When a law imposes taxes or levies from the public, with the intent to give undue benefit or advantage to private persons, or the promotion of private enterprises, that law cannot be said to satisfy the requirement of public purpose.[113] In Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, the petitioning sugar producers, sugarcane planters and millers sought the distribution of the shares of stock of the Republic Planters Bank, alleging that they are the true beneficial owners thereof.[114] In that case, the investment, i.e., the purchase of the said bank, was funded by the deduction of PhP 1.00 per picul from the sugar proceeds of the sugar producers pursuant to P.D. No. 388.[115] In ruling against the petitioners, the Court held that to rule in their favor would contravene the general principle that revenues received from the imposition of taxes or levies "cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons."[116] The Court amply reasoned that the Stabilization Fund must "be utilized for the benefit of the entire sugar industry, and all its components, stabilization of the domestic market including foreign market, the industry being of vital importance to the country's economy and to national interest."[117]

GR No. 171101

2011-07-05

HACIENDA LUISITA v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL

VELASCO JR., J.

In Planters Products v. Fertiphil, [269] the Court summed up its view on the application of the doctrine thus: At any rate, We find the doctrine inapplicable. The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. It produces no rights, imposes no duties and affords no protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation, inoperative as if it has not been passed. Being void, Fertiphil is not required to pay the levy. All levies paid should be refunded in accordance with the general civil code principle against unjust enrichment. The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides:

GR No. 179532

2011-05-30

CLAUDIO S. YAP v. THENAMARIS SHIP'S MANAGEMENT

NACHURA, J.

The doctrine of operative fact serves as an exception to the aforementioned general rule. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation,[29] we held: The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.

GR No. 180050

2011-04-12

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA

NACHURA, J.

The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Decision. In its Resolution[12] dated May 12, 2010,[13] the Court denied the said motions.[14]

GR No. 158562

2010-04-23

RAMON R. YAP v. VS.COMMISION ON AUDIT

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

In this regard, it is necessary for this Court to elaborate on the nature and meaning of the term "public purpose," in relation to disbursement of public funds. As understood in the traditional sense, public purpose or public use means any purpose or use directly available to the general public as a matter of right. Thus, it has also been defined as "an activity as will serve as benefit to [the] community as a body and which at the same time is directly related function of government."[12] However, the concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere, the idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been discarded.[13] In fact, this Court has already categorically stated that the term "public purpose" is not defined, since it is an elastic concept that can be hammered to fit modern standards. It should be given a broad interpretation; therefore, it does not only pertain to those purposes that which are traditionally viewed as essentially government functions, such as building roads and delivery of basic services, but also includes those purposes designed to promote social justice. Thus, public money may now be used for the relocation of illegal settlers, low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform.[14] In short, public use is now equated with public interest,[15] and that it is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons.[16]

	GR No. 209287 2014-07-01	MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO v. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III BERSAMIN, J.
Legal standing, as a requisite for the exercise of judicial review, refers to "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."[43] The concept of legal standing, or locus standi, was particularly discussed in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council,[44] where the Court said: In public or constitutional litigations, the Court is often burdened with the determination of the locus standi of the petitioners due to the ever-present need to regulate the invocation of the intervention of the Court to correct any official action or policy in order to avoid obstructing the efficient functioning of public officials and offices involved in public service. It is required, therefore, that the petitioner must have a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, for, as indicated in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.:
	GR No. 179267 2013-06-25	JESUS C. GARCIA v. GARCIA PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.[44] It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute,[45] "this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law."[46] The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs.[47] We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA[48] that, "[p]lainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows: SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
	GR No. 202242 2013-04-16	FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL MENDOZA, J.
It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair play. To reiterate the doctrine enunciated in Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation:[32]
	GR No. 173425 2013-01-22	FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. CIR DEL CASTILLO, J.
This resolves respondents' Motion for Reconsideration.[1] Respondents raise the following arguments: "1) Prior payment of tax is inherent in the nature and payment of the 8% transitional input tax;[2] 2) Revenue Regulations No. 7-95 providing for 8% transitional input tax based on the value of the improvements on the real properties is a valid legislative rule;[3] 3) For failure to clearly prove its entitlement to the transitional input tax credit, petitioner's claim for tax refund must fail in light of the basic doctrine that tax refund partakes of the nature of a tax exemption which should be construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer."[4]
	GR No. 202242 2012-07-17	FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL MENDOZA, J.
As to the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the JBC is unconstitutional, it bears mentioning that as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.[56] This rule, however, is not absolute. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation,[57] the Court explained: The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
	GR No. 171905 2012-06-20	UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN PHILIPPINES v. BRADFORD UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST PEREZ, J.
The doctrine of locus standi or the right of appearance in a court of justice has been adequately discussed by this Court in a number of cases. The doctrine requires a litigant to have a material interest in the outcome of a case. In private suits, locus standi requires a litigant to be a "real party in interest," which is defined as "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."[51]
	GR Nos. 147036-37 2012-04-10	-ORGANIZATIONS v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ABAD, J.
Section 2 of P.D. 755, Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 961, and Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468 completely ignore the fact that coco-levy funds are public funds raised through taxation. And since taxes could be exacted only for a public purpose, they cannot be declared private properties of individuals although such individuals fall within a distinct group of persons.[65]
	GR Nos. 177857-58 2012-01-24	PHILIPPINE COCONUT v. REPUBLIC VELASCO JR., J.
We have ruled time and again that taxes are imposed only for a public purpose.[111] "They cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons."[112] When a law imposes taxes or levies from the public, with the intent to give undue benefit or advantage to private persons, or the promotion of private enterprises, that law cannot be said to satisfy the requirement of public purpose.[113] In Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, the petitioning sugar producers, sugarcane planters and millers sought the distribution of the shares of stock of the Republic Planters Bank, alleging that they are the true beneficial owners thereof.[114] In that case, the investment, i.e., the purchase of the said bank, was funded by the deduction of PhP 1.00 per picul from the sugar proceeds of the sugar producers pursuant to P.D. No. 388.[115] In ruling against the petitioners, the Court held that to rule in their favor would contravene the general principle that revenues received from the imposition of taxes or levies "cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons."[116] The Court amply reasoned that the Stabilization Fund must "be utilized for the benefit of the entire sugar industry, and all its components, stabilization of the domestic market including foreign market, the industry being of vital importance to the country's economy and to national interest."[117]
	GR No. 171101 2011-07-05	HACIENDA LUISITA v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL VELASCO JR., J.
In Planters Products v. Fertiphil, [269] the Court summed up its view on the application of the doctrine thus: At any rate, We find the doctrine inapplicable. The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. It produces no rights, imposes no duties and affords no protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation, inoperative as if it has not been passed. Being void, Fertiphil is not required to pay the levy. All levies paid should be refunded in accordance with the general civil code principle against unjust enrichment. The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides:
	GR No. 179532 2011-05-30	CLAUDIO S. YAP v. THENAMARIS SHIP'S MANAGEMENT NACHURA, J.
The doctrine of operative fact serves as an exception to the aforementioned general rule. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation,[29] we held: The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
	GR No. 180050 2011-04-12	RODOLFO G. NAVARRO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA NACHURA, J.
The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Decision. In its Resolution[12] dated May 12, 2010,[13] the Court denied the said motions.[14]
	GR No. 158562 2010-04-23	RAMON R. YAP v. VS.COMMISION ON AUDIT LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
In this regard, it is necessary for this Court to elaborate on the nature and meaning of the term "public purpose," in relation to disbursement of public funds. As understood in the traditional sense, public purpose or public use means any purpose or use directly available to the general public as a matter of right. Thus, it has also been defined as "an activity as will serve as benefit to [the] community as a body and which at the same time is directly related function of government."[12] However, the concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere, the idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been discarded.[13] In fact, this Court has already categorically stated that the term "public purpose" is not defined, since it is an elastic concept that can be hammered to fit modern standards. It should be given a broad interpretation; therefore, it does not only pertain to those purposes that which are traditionally viewed as essentially government functions, such as building roads and delivery of basic services, but also includes those purposes designed to promote social justice. Thus, public money may now be used for the relocation of illegal settlers, low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform.[14] In short, public use is now equated with public interest,[15] and that it is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons.[16]

PLANTERS PRODUCTS v. FERTIPHIL CORPORATION