This case has been cited 6 times or more.
2015-08-05 |
BRION, J. |
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A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law to make out a case or sustain the issue.[32] The party filing the demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence. The Court's task is to ascertain if there is competent or sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt.[33] | |||||
2013-01-28 |
BRION, J. |
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The Court is not unaware of the rule that if there was a categorical finding in the administrative case that expressly rules out one (or more) of the essential elements of the crime for which the respondent is likewise sought to be held liable, then his exoneration in the administrative case can be pleaded for his acquittal in the criminal case.[81] This rule, however, obviously finds no application in the present case. The CA and, subsequently, this Court merely affirmed the administrative finding of the Ombudsman that Cesa and his co-petitioners are guilty of neglect of duty. Nowhere did the uniform rulings in the administrative case even hint that the administrative finding bars or forecloses a further determination of the gravity of the petitioners' negligence as was the prosecution's theory for purposes of criminal prosecution. | |||||
2011-08-31 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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In Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan,[29] the Court reiterated: This Court is not unmindful of its rulings that the dismissal of an administrative case does not bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts subject of the administrative complaint and that the disposition in one case does not inevitably govern the resolution of the other case/s and vice versa. x x x | |||||
2010-07-05 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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Although the dismissal of the criminal case cannot be pleaded to abate the administrative proceedings primarily on the ground that the quantum of proof required to sustain administrative charges is significantly lower than that necessary for criminal actions, the same does not hold true if it were the other way around, that is, the dismissal of the administrative case is being invoked to abate the criminal case. The reason is that the evidence presented in the administrative case may not necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in the criminal case. The prosecution is certainly not precluded from adducing additional evidence to discharge the burden of proof required in the criminal cases.[24] However, if the criminal case will be prosecuted based on the same facts and evidence as that in the administrative case, and the court trying the latter already squarely ruled on the absence of facts and/or circumstances sufficient to negate the basis of the criminal indictment,[25] then to still burden the accused to present controverting evidence despite the failure of the prosecution to present sufficient and competent evidence, will be a futile and useless exercise. | |||||
2009-12-23 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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Although alleged by accused-appellants Ara and Musa, no reason was given in the appeal as to why the trial court erred in denying their Demurrer to Evidence. Whatever their basis may be, an action on a demurrer or on a motion to dismiss rests on the sound exercise of judicial discretion.[28] In Gutib v. CA,[29] we explained that: A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. | |||||
2008-10-29 |
NACHURA, J. |
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The only exception to this rule is when the trial court gravely abused its discretion in denying the motion.[22] This exception is, nevertheless, applied sparingly, and only in instances when there is a clear showing that the trial court exercised its judicial power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.[23] Further, the abuse of the court's discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by, or to act at all in contemplation of, law.[24] |