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MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA v. MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS

This case has been cited 5 times or more.

	GR No. 210987 2014-11-24	PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE v. SECRETARY OF FINANCE VELASCO JR., J.
It is axiomatic that laws should be given a reasonable interpretation which does not defeat the very purpose for which they were passed.[17] Courts should not follow the letter of a statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the purpose of the act.[18] This Court has, in many cases involving the construction of statutes, cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose of the legislator, and rejected the literal interpretation of statutes if to do so would lead to unjust or absurd results.[19]
	GR No. 176162 2012-10-09	CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. CA MENDOZA, J.
The Court is not unaware of the use of the words "private citizen" in the subject provision and the plain meaning rule of statutory construction which requires that when the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says. The Court, however, finds that a simplistic interpretation is not in keeping with the intention of the statute and prevailing jurisprudence. It is a well-established rule that laws should be given a reasonable interpretation so as not to defeat the very purpose for which they were passed. As such, "a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results."[20] In Secretary of Justice v. Koruga,[21] the Court emphasized this principle and cautioned us on the overzealous application of the plain meaning rule: The general rule in construing words and phrases used in a statute is that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, they should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. However, a literal interpretation of a statute is to be rejected if it will operate unjustly, lead to absurd results, or contract the evident meaning of the statute taken as a whole. After all, statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Indeed, courts are not to give words meanings that would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences.[22]
	GR No. 139930 2012-06-26	REPUBLIC v. EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO ABAD, J.
About 10 years later or on March 1, 1990 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019[6] against respondents, the 1979 members of the UCPB board of directors, before the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The OSG alleged that UCPB's investment in UNICOM was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government since UNICOM had a capitalization of only P5 million and it had no track record of operation. In the process of conversion to voting common shares, the government's P495 million investment was reduced by P95 million which was credited to UNICOM's incorporators. The PCGG subsequently referred the complaint to the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-90-2810 in line with the ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,[7] which disqualified the PCGG from conducting the preliminary investigation in the case.
	GR No. 182147 2010-12-15	ARNEL U. TY v. NBI SUPERVISING AGENT MARVIN E. DE JEMIL VELASCO JR., J.
Thus, the application of the legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which means the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. If a statute enumerates the thing upon which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect.[74] The fourth officer in the enumerated list is the catch-all "such other officer charged with the management of the business affairs" of the corporation or juridical entity which is a factual issue which must be alleged and supported by evidence.
	GR No. 163072 2009-04-02	MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. CITY OF PASAY CARPIO, J.
Furthermore, the airport lands and buildings of MIAA are properties of public dominion intended for public use, and as such are exempt from real property tax under Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code. However, under the same provision, if MIAA leases its real property to a taxable person, the specific property leased becomes subject to real property tax.[12] In this case, only those portions of the NAIA Pasay properties which are leased to taxable persons like private parties are subject to real property tax by the City of Pasay.