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SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY v. JOSE L. ATIENZA

This case has been cited 9 times or more.

	GR No. 188213 2016-01-11	NATIVIDAD C. CRUZ v. PANDACAN HIKER'S CLUB PERALTA, J.
The general welfare clause provides for the exercise of police power for the attainment or maintenance of the general welfare of the community. The power, however, is exercised by the government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights.[43] Jurisprudence defines police power as the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.[44] The Latin maxim is salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law).[45] Police power is vested primarily with the national legislature, which may delegate the same to local governments through the enactment of ordinances through their legislative bodies (the sanggunians)[46] The so-called general welfare clause, provided for in Section 16 of the Local Government Code, provides for such delegation of police power, to wit: Section 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morale, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
	GR No. 187836 2015-03-10	SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY OFFICERS v. ALFREDO S. LIM PEREZ, J.
There are overwhelming reasons stated in the Decision to support the Court's pronouncement that the very nature of depots has no place in a densely populated area, among others, the very history of the Pandacan terminals where flames spread over the entire City of Manila when fuel storage dumps were set on fire in December 1941[14] and the other incident of explosion,[15] which were both considered in G.R. No. 156052.
	AM No. 09-5-2-SC 2013-04-11	IN MATTER OF BREWING CONTROVERSIES IN ELECTIONS OF INTEGRATED BAR OF PHILIPPINES. ATTYS. MARCIAL M. MAGSINO v. ATTYS. ROGELIO A. VINLUAN MENDOZA, J.
As previously mentioned, in Velez, [48] the Court stated that the rotation system applies to the election of the EVP only and considered the service of then EVP De Vera, representing the Eastern Mindanao region, as having completed the first rotational cycle. For said reason, the Court affirmed the election of Salazar of Bicolandia as EVP. The Court explained that the rotation cycle with respect to the presidency would have been completed with the succession of EVP De Vera as IBP-President. The specific words used in Velez [49] were: In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is actually rotated among the nine Regional Governors. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is merely a result of the automatic succession rule of the IBP EVP to the Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule pertains in particular to the position of IBP EVP, while the automatic succession rule pertains to the Presidency. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is but a consequence of the automatic succession rule provided in Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
	GR No. 165153 2010-08-25	CARLOS DE CASTRO v. LIBERTY BROADCASTING NETWORK BRION, J.
"The Court does not take judicial notice of proceedings in the various courts of justice in the Philippines."[32] At the time we decided the present case, we were thus not bound to take note of and consider the pendency of the rehabilitation proceedings, as the matter had not been properly brought to our attention. In Social Justice Society v. Atienza,[33] we said that: In resolving controversies, courts can only consider facts and issues pleaded by the parties. Courts, as well as magistrates presiding over them are not omniscient. They can only act on the facts and issues presented before them in appropriate pleadings. They may not even substitute their own personal knowledge for evidence. Nor may they take notice of matters except those expressly provided as subjects of mandatory judicial notice.
	GR No. 191002 2010-04-20	ARTURO M. DE CASTRO v. JBC BERSAMIN, J.
To partly quote the wording of the Constitution, Article VIII, Section 8(1) and (5) provide that "A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court... It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it." Supervision, as a legal concept, more often than not, is defined in relation with the concept of control.[20] In Social Justice Society v. Atienza,[21] we defined "supervision" as follows: [Supervision] means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
	GR No. 182434 2010-03-05	SULTAN YAHYA 'JERRY' M. TOMAWIS v. RASAD G. BALINDONG VELASCO JR., J.
We have held that a general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and should be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to both.[32] In the instant case, we apply the principle generalia specialibus non derogant. A general law does not nullify a special law. The general law will yield to the special law in the specific and particular subject embraced in the latter.[33] We must read and construe BP 129 and PD 1083 together, then by taking PD 1083 as an exception to the general law to reconcile the two laws. This is so since the legislature has not made any express repeal or modification of PD 1083, and it is well-settled that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored.[34] Implied repeals will not be declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest. Laws are assumed to be passed only after careful deliberation and with knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, and it follows that the legislature did not intend to interfere with or abrogate a former law relating to the same subject matter.[35]
	GR No. 136466 2009-11-25	HEIRS OF AURELIO REYES v. ERNESTO D. GARILAO PERALTA, J.
This Court cannot subscribe to petitioners' view. This Court is guided by Social Justice Society v. Atienza Jr.,[35] wherein the operation of implied repeals was extensively discussed, to wit: Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals the intention of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect.
	GR No. 176487 2009-08-25	REPUBLIC v. FAR EAST ENTERPRISES CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
This Court recognizes the power of a local government to reclassify and convert lands through local ordinance, especially if said ordinance is approved by the HLURB.[58] In Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court Appeals,[59] we acknowledged the power of local government units to adopt zoning ordinances. Discretion is vested in the appropriate government agencies to determine the suitability of a land for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes.[60] It is also a settled rule that an ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity.[61] Having the power to classify lands, the local government unit may consider factors that are just, reasonable and legal, for it is within the local government unit's power to determine these. However, if they abuse their authority in the performance of this duty, the courts, if prompted, can step in.
	GR No. 167614 2009-03-24	ANTONIO M. SERRANO v. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Duration of contract 12 months Position Chief Officer Basic monthly salary US$1,400.00 Hours of work 48.0 hours per week Overtime US$700.00 per month Vacation leave with pay 7.00 days per month[5] On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.[6]