This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2014-12-01 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Appellants' contention that the consideration of the sale was not established since the buy-bust money was not presented as evidence is unavailing. Suffice it to say that "[n]either law nor jurisprudence requires the presentation of any of the money used in a buy-bust operation x x x."[15] "It is sufficient to show that the illicit transaction did take place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti in evidence. These were done, and were proved by the prosecution's evidence."[16] | |||||
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2014-02-19 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| To secure a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, the following essential elements must be duly established: (1) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.[38] Succinctly, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer, as well as the receipt of the marked money by the seller, successfully consummates the buy-bust transaction. Hence, what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.[39] | |||||
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2012-10-24 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Applying this principle in Alberca, the Court held in People v. Santiago:[44] | |||||
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2010-06-16 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Further, the actions of the police officers, in relation to the procedural rules on the chain of custody, enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. Courts accord credence and full faith to the testimonies of police authorities, as they are presumed to be performing their duties regularly, absent any convincing proof to the contrary.[39] | |||||
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2009-06-22 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The non-presentation of the confidential informant is not fatal to the prosecution. Informants are usually not presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the police. It is well-settled that except when the petitioner vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, or there are reasons to believe that the arresting officers had motives to testify falsely against the petitioner, or that only the informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the entire transaction, the testimony of the informant may be dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative of the apprehending officers' eyewitness testimonies. There is no need to present the informant in court where the sale was actually witnessed and adequately proved by prosecution witnesses.[36] The testimony of an informant who witnessed the illegal sale of shabu is not essential for conviction and may be dispensed with if the poseur-buyer testified on the same, because the informant's testimony would merely corroborate that of the poseur-buyer.[37] What can be fatal is the nonâ€'presentation of the poseur-buyer, if there is no other eyewitness to the illicit transaction[38] -- not the nonâ€'presentation of the informant whose testimony under certain circumstances would be merely corroborative or cumulative.[39] | |||||
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2009-06-05 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| What is more, both denial and alibi are considered as the weakest defenses not only due to their inherent weakness and unreliability, but also because they are easy to fabricate.[23] Nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence that alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and identification of the accused by the complainant.[24] Such is the situation in the instant case. Malate was positively and categorically identified by the complainant. As has been consistently ruled by this Court, an affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. And both alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.[25] | |||||
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2008-03-04 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Defense on the other hand, tried to show that it was the victim who started the unlawful aggression through witnesses Daniel Cayong and accused Aron Licyayo. They failed miserably, however, to show this. Daniel Cayong, in his direct examination narrated that it was not only Rufino Guay who started the trouble but rather he and his two companions Joel Dumangeng and Jeffrey Malingan took hold of Aron Licyayo and started punching him. The latter witness, as shown earlier, showed his bias by inculpating the deceased only to contradict himself that the fight suddenly started when he and the deceased grappled.[37] The rule is that the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.[38] | |||||
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2008-02-26 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The rule is that the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.[29] | |||||