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CANELAND SUGAR CORPORATION v. REYNALDO M. ALON

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

	GR No. 175723 2014-02-04	CITY OF MANILA v. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO PERALTA, J.
In any case , the Court finds it necessary to resolve the issue on jurisdiction raised by petitioners owing to its significance and for future guidance of both bench and bar. It is a settled principle that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.[14]
	GR No. 181643 2010-11-17	MICHELLE I. PINEDA v. CA MENDOZA, J.
At any rate, the Court finds no cogent reason for the reversal and setting aside by the CA of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the RTC. The very writ of preliminary injunction set aside by the CA could no longer lie for the acts sought to be enjoined had already been accomplished or consummated.[20] The DepEd already prohibited Pineda from operating the school canteen. As correctly ruled by the CA in its questioned decision, since Pineda had ceased the operation of the school canteen since 2005, the RTC's preliminary writ should be set aside as there was nothing more to enjoin. The Court agrees with the CA when it explained: A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action. Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully.
	GR No. 190382 2010-03-09	JOSEPH BERNARDEZ v. COMELEC PERALTA, J.
In Caneland Sugar Corporation v. Alon,[23] it was settled that injunctive reliefs are preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights and interests. Injunction is not a cause of action in itself, but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. When the act sought to be enjoined has become fait accompli, the prayer for provisional remedy should be denied.
	GR No.176249 2009-11-27	FVC LABOR UNION-PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT v. SAMA-SAMANG NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA SA FVC-SOLIDARITY OF INDEPENDENT BRION, J.
While SANAMA-SIGLO has manifested its abandonment of its challenge to the exclusive bargaining representation status of FVCLU-PTGWO, we deem it necessary in the exercise of our discretion to resolve the question of law raised since this exclusive representation status issue will inevitably recur in the future as workplace parties avail of opportunities to prolong workplace harmony by extending the term of CBAs already in place.[20]
	GR No.176249 2009-11-27	FVC LABOR UNION-PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT v. SAMA-SAMANG NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA SA FVC-SOLIDARITY OF INDEPENDENT BRION, J.
While SANAMA-SIGLO has manifested its abandonment of its challenge to the exclusive bargaining representation status of FVCLU-PTGWO, we deem it necessary in the exercise of our discretion to resolve the question of law raised since this exclusive representation status issue will inevitably recur in the future as workplace parties avail of opportunities to prolong workplace harmony by extending the term of CBAs already in place.[20]
	GR No. 153690 2008-08-26	DAVID LU v. PATERNO LU YM NACHURA, J.
The RTC decision on the merits of the case gives this Court more reasons to declare the mootness of the instant petition. It must be recalled that the motion to lift the receivership was filed before the RTC ancillary to the principal action, and what was sought to be enjoined was the hearing on that particular motion. With the decision on the merits rendered by the RTC, albeit still on appeal, there is nothing more to be enjoined. More importantly, the RTC ordered that the receivers cease from performing their functions and that a management committee be created.[58] Clearly, these supervening events mooted the petition. Time and again, we have declared that a petition should be denied for the sole reason that the act sought to be enjoined is already fait accompli.[59]