This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2015-07-13 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| In the same vein, petitioners are clutching at straws in impressing upon this Court that petitioner Bravo, in signing the Indemnity Agreement in his personal capacity, has already bound himself to be jointly and severally liable with Mapfre for the monetary award and this has the effect of securing the bond. Suffice it to say that "[t]he obvious purpose of an appeal bond is to ensure, during the period of appeal, against any occurrence that would defeat or diminish recovery by the aggrieved employees under the judgment if subsequently affirmed."[42] To the Court's mind, the intention in requiring a security deposit or collateral to secure the bond, apart from the indemnity agreement between the employer-appellant and the bonding company, is to further ensure recovery by the employee of the judgment award should the same be affirmed, in any and all eventualities. This is also in keeping with the purpose of the bond requirement which is to "discourage employers from using the appeal to delay, or even evade, their obligation to satisfy their employee's possible just and lawful claims."[43] Besides, it is an ail-too familiar rule in statutory construction that when a rule is clear and unambiguous, interpretation need not be resorted to.[44] Since Section 6, Rule VI of the 2005 NLRC Rules of Procedure requires that a surety bond should be accompanied by both an indemnity agreement and proof of security deposit or collateral securing the bond, among others, that two must be presented. The submission of one cannot be considered sufficient as to dispense with the other. No resort to any interpretation is necessary, there is only room for application.[45] | |||||
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2008-08-22 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Petitioner's objection was frivolous. Under Section 33[68] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the MeTC is conditionally vested with authority to resolve the question of ownership raised as an incident in the case, the determination of which is necessary for a complete adjudication of the issue of possession.[69] In the present case, the MeTC's foray into the issue of whether under P.D. No. 1517, petitioner has preferential rights to the purchase and occupation of Unit 1682 as against respondents' rights was necessary to resolve the issue of material possession. | |||||
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2008-06-17 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Hence, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. To repeat, the only issue that the court has to settle in an ejectment suit is the right to physical possession.[22] While it may be true that the issue of ownership may incidentally be looked into in an ejectment case to determine who has a better right to possession,[23] yet, it is crystal clear in this case that the issue of ownership over the subject property has not been seriously and successfully intertwined with the issue of possession. It has definitely been established by the testimony of Nuguid, the vendor of the property, and by ocular inspection of the MCTC of Capas, Tarlac, that the subject land is outside or not part of the lot sold to respondent. | |||||