This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2014-04-21 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| The principle of indefeasibility of the Torrens title does not protect OCT No. 2150 because the free patent on which the issuance of the title was based was null and void. A direct attack as well as a collateral attack are proper, for, as the Court declared in De Guzman v. Agbagala:[59] | |||||
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2012-02-01 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| It is elementary that parties have the burden of proving their respective allegations.[82] Since petitioners allege that they have a title which was issued earlier than SMC's title, it was their burden to prove the alleged existence and priority of their title. The trial and appellate courts' shared conclusion that petitioners' TCT No. T-17186 does not exist in the official records is a finding of fact that is binding on this Court. Petitioners have not offered a reason or pointed to evidence that would justify overturning this finding. Neither did they assert that this factual finding is unsubstantiated by the records. Without a title, petitioners cannot assert priority or presumptive conclusiveness.[83] | |||||
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2011-07-27 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| Indeed, we have ruled that if the land covered by free patent was a private land, the Director of Lands has no jurisdiction over it. Such free patent and the subsequent certificate of title issued pursuant thereto are a nullity.[35] The aggrieved party may initiate an action for cancellation of such title. In the recent case of De Guzman v. Agbagala,[36] the Court reiterated: The settled rule is that a free patent issued over a private land is null and void, and produces no legal effects whatsoever. Private ownership of land - as when there is a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered possessory information or a clear showing of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or previous occupants - is not affected by the issuance of a free patent over the same land, because the Public Land [L]aw applies only to lands of the public domain. The Director of Lands has no authority to grant free patent to lands that have ceased to be public in character and have passed to private ownership. Consequently, a certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding only if the land covered by it is really a part of the disposable land of the public domain.[37] | |||||
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2010-06-23 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| Respondents' application for sales patent, however, should not be used to prejudice or derogate what may be deemed as their vested right over the subject property. The sales patent application should instead be considered as a mere superfluity particularly since ownership over the land, which they seek to buy from the State, is already vested upon them by virtue of acquisitive prescription. Moreover, the State does not have any authority to convey a property through the issuance of a grant or a patent if the land is no longer a public land.[39] | |||||
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2004-02-16 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| The respondents filed their Notice of Appeal on April 19, 1999. The trial court issued an Order on April 26, 1999 giving due course to the appeal[11] and ordered the Branch Clerk of Court to elevate the records to the Court of Appeals (CA). The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the following grounds: (a) the respondents did not indicate in their notice of appeal to which court the appeal was made; and, (b) the appeal should be to the Supreme Court which has appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the RTC involving the constitutionality of ordinances under Article VIII, Section 5(2) of the Constitution. On May 25, 1999, the Court issued an Order denying the said motion.[12] The appeal of the respondents was docketed in the CA as CA-G.R. CV No. 63566. | |||||
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2004-02-16 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.[20] There is identity of parties in this case and in CA-G.R. CV No. 63566. The petitioners herein are the appellees in the CA, while the private respondents herein are the appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 63566 | |||||
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2004-02-16 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| WHEEFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayed that during the pendency of the case a preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the enforcement of said City Ordinance as amended and that after hearing the case on the merits judgment be rendered (a) declaring the City Ordinance No. 801, as amended, of the City of Cebu VOID and enjoining the defendants not to enforce it, and to issue a permanent injunction of the enforcement of said Ordinance; (b) ordering the defendants to pay, jointly and severally, both plaintiffs the sum of P100,000.00 as compensatory damage, the sum of P300,000.00 as moral damage, the sum of P100,000.00 as exemplary damage, the sum of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, the sum of P20,000.00 as litigation expenses, and to pay the costs.[21] The petitioners' ploy in this case is evident to inveigle the Court to preempt the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 63566. They would want this Court to render judgment in their favor. This, however, would create the possibility of the CA rendering a decision in favor of the respondents herein and against the petitioners two different fora rendering two different decisions on the same issues. Such pernicious ploy cannot be countenanced by the Court. The petitioners must be warned that a repetition of the same will merit the appropriate sanction. As it was, the CA rendered a decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 63566 on June 16, 2003, reversing the decision of the RTC and ordering the dismissal of the petitioners' complaint. The CA ruled that Ordinance No. 1664 is constitutional and that consequently, the appellants therein (respondents herein) are not liable to the appellees (petitioners herein) for damages. The case is now before the Court En Banc, docketed as G.R. No. 159110. | |||||