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MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY and ANTONIO P. GANA v. OLONGAPO MAINTENANCE SERVICES

This case has been cited 8 times or more.

	GR No. 199199 2013-08-27	MARICRIS D. DOLOT v. RAMON PAJE REYES, J.
The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay.[30] Now cast in stone under Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of continuing mandamus enjoys a distinct procedure than that of ordinary civil actions for the enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which are covered by Part II (Civil Procedure). Similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules requires that the petition filed should be sufficient in form and substance before a court may take further action; otherwise, the court may dismiss the petition outright. Courts must be cautioned, however, that the determination to give due course to the petition or dismiss it outright is an exercise of discretion that must be applied in a reasonable manner in consonance with the spirit of the law and always with the view in mind of seeing to it that justice is served.[31]
	GR No. 201112 2012-06-13	ARCHBISHOP FERNANDO R. CAPALLA v. COMELEC PERALTA, J.
Now on the substantive issues. In order to achieve the modernization program of the Philippine Electoral System, which includes the automation of the counting, transmission and canvassing of votes for the May 2010 national and local elections with systems integration and over-all project management in a comprehensive and well-managed manner,[31] the Comelec entered into an AES contract with Smartmatic-TIM for the lease of goods and purchase of services under the contract, with option to purchase the goods.
	GR No. 201112 2012-06-13	ARCHBISHOP FERNANDO R. CAPALLA v. COMELEC PERALTA, J.
At the outset, we brush aside the procedural barriers (i.e., locus standi of petitioners and the non-observance of the hierarchy of courts) that supposedly prevent the Court from entertaining the consolidated petitions. As we held in Guingona, Jr. v. Commission on Elections:[28]
	GR No. 201112 2012-06-13	ARCHBISHOP FERNANDO R. CAPALLA v. COMELEC PERALTA, J.
On March 6, 2012, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 9373[8] resolving to seriously consider exercising the OTP subject to certain conditions. On March 21, 2012, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 9376[9] resolving to exercise the OTP the PCOS and CCS hardware and software in accordance with the AES contract between the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM in connection with the May 10, 2010 elections subject to the following conditions: (1) the warranties agreed upon in the AES contract shall be in full force and effect; (2) the original price for the hardware and software covered by the OTP as specified in the AES contract shall be maintained, excluding the cost of the 920 units of PCOS and related peripherals previously purchased for use in the 2010 special elections; and (3) all other services related to the 2013 AES shall be subject to public bidding. On March 29, 2012, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 9377[10] resolving to accept Smartmatic-TIM's offer to extend the period to exercise the OTP until March 31, 2012 and to authorize Chairman Brillantes to sign for and on behalf of the Comelec the Agreement on the Extension of the OTP Under the AES Contract[11] (Extension Agreement, for brevity). The aforesaid Extension Agreement was signed on March 30, 2012.[12] On even date, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 9378[13] resolving to approve the Deed of Sale between the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM to purchase the latter's PCOS machines (hardware and software) to be used in the upcoming May 2013 elections and to authorize Chairman Brillantes to sign the Deed of Sale for and on behalf of the Comelec. The Deed of Sale[14] was forthwith executed.
	GR No. 201112 2012-06-13	ARCHBISHOP FERNANDO R. CAPALLA v. COMELEC PERALTA, J.
In Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) v. Pozzolanic Philippines Incorporated,[50] the Court nullified the right of first refusal granted to respondent therein in the Batangas Contract for being contrary to public policy. The Court explained that the same violated the requirement of competitive public bidding in the government contract, because the grant of the right of first refusal did not only substantially amend the terms of the contract bidded upon so that resultantly the other bidders thereto were deprived of the terms and opportunities granted to respondent therein after it won the public auction, but also altered the bid terms by effectively barring any and all true bidding in the future.[51]
	GR No. 183789 2011-08-24	POWER SECTOR ASSETS v. POZZOLANIC PHILIPPINES INCORPORATED PEREZ, J.
The rationale behind the requirement of a public bidding, as a mode of awarding government contracts, is to ensure that the people get maximum benefits and quality services from the contracts. More significantly, strict compliance with the requirement of public bidding echoes the call for transparency in government transactions and accountability of public officers. Public biddings are intended to minimize occasions for corruption and temptations to abuse discretion on the part of government authorities in awarding contracts.[89]
	GR No. 182042 2011-07-27	THUNDER SECURITY v. NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY VILLARAMA, JR., J.
In this case, it is apparent that when the RTC issued its December 1, 2005 Order, petitioner has no more legal rights under the service contract which already expired on September 15, 2003. Therefore, it has not met the first vital requisite that it must have material and substantial rights that have to be protected by the courts.[33] It bears stressing that an injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. There must exist an actual right.[34] Verily, petitioner cannot lay claim to an actual, clear and positive right based on an expired service contract.
	GR No. 178158 2009-12-04	STRATEGIC ALLIANCE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. RADSTOCK SECURITIES LIMITED CARPIO, J.
Yes.[64] (Emphasis supplied) Forming part of the General Fund, the toll fees can only be disposed of in accordance with the fundamental principles governing financial transactions and operations of any government agency, to wit: (1) no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law, as expressly mandated by Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution; and (2) government funds or property shall be spent or used solely for public purposes, as expressly mandated by Section 4(2) of PD 1445 or the Government Auditing Code.[65]