This case has been cited 10 times or more.
2014-02-11 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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Based on the above provision, double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first jeopardy attached; (2) it has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.[127] | |||||
2013-02-20 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. This constitutionally mandated right is procedurally buttressed by Section 17 of Rule 117[28] of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy, the accused has the burden of demonstrating the following requisites: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as in the first.[29] As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment, (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.[30] The test for the third element is whether one offense is identical with the other or is an attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information. | |||||
2011-09-12 |
PERALTA, J. |
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On this point alone, the petition is already dismissible. However, on several occasions, this Court found compelling reasons to relax the rule on observance on hierarchy of courts. In Pacoy v. Cajigal,[17] the Court opted not to strictly apply said doctrine, since the issue involved is double jeopardy, considered to be one of the most fundamental constitutional rights of an accused. Hence, the Court also finds sufficient reason to relax the rule in this case as it also involves the issue of double jeopardy, necessitating a look into the merits of the petition. | |||||
2010-08-03 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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The Court distinguishes the factual milieus in Buhat v. CA[58] and Pacoy v. Cajigal,[59] wherein the amendment of the caption of the Information from homicide to murder was not considered substantial because there was no real change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged as alleged in the body of the Information, as the allegations of qualifying circumstances were already clearly embedded in the original Information. Buhat pointed out that the original Information for homicide already alleged the use of superior strength, while Pacoy states that the averments in the amended Information for murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in the original Information for homicide. None of these peculiar circumstances obtains in the present case. | |||||
2010-05-05 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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The established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts,[29] as a rule, requires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.[30] A regard for judicial hierarchy clearly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed in the RTC and those against the latter should be filed in the Court of Appeals.[31] The rule is not iron-clad, however, as it admits of certain exceptions. | |||||
2009-10-30 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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It is the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, or dismissal or termination of the case without the approval of the accused that bars further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or the frustration thereof.[32] At the heart of the policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second judgment for the same offense would arm the government with a potent instrument of oppression. The constitutional provision, therefore, guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. Nevertheless, the prosecution is entitled to one opportunity to require the accused to stand trial. Should the prosecution waive this right to a full-blown trial, the defendant has the right to have his or her trial completed by a particular tribunal.[33] If the trial is terminated before it is completed, and it is dismissed with the consent of the defendant, then double jeopardy will not attach. | |||||
2009-09-04 |
BRION, J. |
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On the non-observance of the principle of hierarchy of courts, it must be remembered that this rule generally applies to cases involving conflicting factual allegations. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot be brought immediately before us as we are not triers of facts.[13] A strict application of this rule may be excused when the reason behind the rule is not present in a case, as in the present case, where the issues are not factual but purely legal. In these types of questions, this Court has the ultimate say so that we merely abbreviate the review process if we, because of the unique circumstances of a case, choose to hear and decide the legal issues outright.[14] | |||||
2009-08-05 |
BRION, J. |
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Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.[10] | |||||
2009-07-30 |
PERALTA, J. |
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And, even if We treat the petition to have been filed under Rule 65, the same is still dismissible for violating the principle on hierarchy of courts. Generally, a direct resort to us in a petition for certiorari is highly improper, for it violates the established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts.[37] This principle, as a rule, requires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. However, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. A strict application of the rule is not necessary when cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions.[38] | |||||
2009-01-30 |
CORONA, J. |
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Generally, a direct resort to us in a petition for certiorari is incorrect for it violates the hierarchy of courts.[10] A regard for judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed in the RTC and those against the latter should be filed in the Court of Appeals.[11] This rule, however, may be relaxed when pure questions of law[12] are raised as in this case. |