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JIMMY T. GO v. ALBERTO T. LOOYUKO

This case has been cited 5 times or more.

	GR No. 208343 2016-02-03	SPS. CEFERINO C. LAUS v. OPTIMUM SECURITY SERVICES PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Besides, as the CA further observed, the WPI issued by the RTC no longer serves any purpose, considering that respondent already vacated the subject properties since the Security Service Contract with Mr. Arceo had already expired.[45] Time and again, the Court has repeatedly held that when the act sought to be enjoined has become fait accompli, the prayer for preliminary injunction should be denied.[46] Indeed, when the events sought to be prevented by injunction or prohibition had already happened, nothing more could be enjoined or prohibited.[47] An injunction will not issue to restrain the performance of an act already done.[48]
	GR No. 190112 2015-04-22	PRIMO CO v. PHILIPPINE CANINE CLUB BRION, J.
The Court also ruled in Go v. Looyuko[19] that when events sought to be prevented by injunction or prohibition have already happened, nothing more could be enjoined or prohibited. It is a universal principle of law that an injunction will not issue to restrain the performance of an act already done. A writ of injunction becomes moot and academic after the act sought to be enjoined has already been consummated.
	GR No. 190382 2010-03-09	JOSEPH BERNARDEZ v. COMELEC PERALTA, J.
In Go v. Looyuko,[24] the Court ruled that when the events sought to be prevented by injunction or prohibition have already happened, nothing more could be enjoined or prohibited. Indeed, it is a universal principle of law that an injunction will not issue to restrain the performance of an act already done. This is so for the simple reason that nothing more can be done in reference thereto. A writ of injunction becomes moot and academic after the act sought to be enjoined has already been consummated.
	AM No. CA-10-49-J 2010-01-28	RAMON C. GONZALES v. CA ASSOCIATE JUSTICE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO CARPIO MORALES, J.
Respondent's justification for the delay in resolving the motion for inhibition â"€ in deference to the authority of this Court to resolve the issues raised in the petition for certiorari â"€ does not impress. Section 7 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for certiorari shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding with the case. This rule must be strictly adhered to by appellate and lower courts notwithstanding the possibility that the proceedings undertaken by them tend to or would render nugatory the pending petition before this Court.[15]
	GR No. 171500 2008-04-30	FERNANDO C. PARMA v. OFFICE OF DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON and MAYOR LOURDES SEÑAR VELASCO JR., J.
Go v. Looyuko[33] explains the concept of grave abuse of discretion in the following wise:Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal may only be considered to have been done in grave abuse of discretion when the act was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.[34] An error of judgment committed in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the same as "grave abuse of discretion." An abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.