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TOYOTA MOTOR PHILS. CORP. WORKERS ASSOCIATION v. NLRC

This case has been cited 15 times or more.

2015-08-05
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
For a valid finding of abandonment, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable cause; and (b) clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts.[56]
2013-07-15
PEREZ, J.
The leading case of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. NLRC[15] enunciated the ruling that separation pay "as a measure of social justice" is allowed in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character.[16]  The case of Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. NLRC[17] expanded the doctrine laid down in PLDT by adding dismissals other than those under Art. 282 of the Labor Code, like willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of trust, and commission of a crime against the employer or his family which would preclude award of separation pay.
2013-06-03
MENDOZA, J.
In the subsequent case of Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. National Labor Relations Commission,[20] it was further elucidated that "in addition to serious misconduct, in dismissals based on other grounds under Art. 282 like willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of trust, and commission of a crime against the employer or his family, separation pay should not be conceded to the dismissed employee."[21] In Reno Foods, Inc, v. Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa (NLM)-Katipunan,[22] the Court wrote that "separation pay is only warranted when the cause for termination is not attributable to the employee's fault, such as those provided in Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, as well as in cases of illegal dismissal in which reinstatement is no longer feasible.  It is not allowed when an employee is dismissed for just cause."[23]
2012-03-14
PERALTA, J.
Thus, the above-quoted provision sanctions the dismissal of a Union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike or who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a lawful strike.[23]  In this case, the Union officers were in clear breach of the above provision of law when they knowingly participated in the illegal strike.[24]
2011-11-16
MENDOZA, J.
However, Padao is not entitled to financial assistance.  In Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association v. NLRC,[52] the Court reaffirmed the general rule that separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct, willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of trust, commission of a crime against the employer or his family, or those reflecting on his moral character.  These five grounds are just causes for dismissal as provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code.
2010-12-15
NACHURA, J.
In Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association (TMPCWA), et al. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[16] citing Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman,[17] we stated that the petition satisfies the formal requirements only with regard to the petitioner who signed the petition, but not his co-petitioner who did not sign nor authorize the other petitioner to sign it on his behalf.  Thus, the petition can be given due course only as to the parties who signed it. The other petitioners who did not sign the verification and certificate against forum shopping cannot be recognized as petitioners and have no legal standing before the Court. The petition should be dismissed outright with respect to the non-conforming petitioners.
2010-12-13
DEL CASTILLO, J.
We are aware that in several instances this Court has awarded separation pay as a measure of social justice. However, the matter of the award of separation pay based on social justice has been clarified in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations Commission[41] where the Court categorically declared that "separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for cause other than serious misconduct x x x." Likewise, we ruled in Toyota Motor Philippines Corp. Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. National Labor Relations Commission[42] that in addition to serious misconduct, separation pay should not be conceded to an employee who was dismissed based on willful disobedience.
2010-11-15
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
In Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. National Labor Relations Commission,[44] petitioners union and members held similar protest rallies infront of the offices of BLR and DOLE Secretary and at the company plants.  We declared that said mass actions constituted illegal strikes: Petitioner Union contends that the protests or rallies conducted on February 21 and 23, 2001 are not within the ambit of strikes as defined in the Labor Code, since they were legitimate exercises of their right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. Mainly relying on the doctrine laid down in the case of Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., it argues that the protest was not directed at Toyota but towards the Government (DOLE and BLR). It explains that the protest is not a strike as contemplated in the Labor Code.  The Union points out that in Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization, the mass action staged in Malacañang to petition the Chief Executive against the abusive behavior of some police officers was a proper exercise of the employees' right to speak out and to peaceably gather and ask government for redress of their grievances.
2010-10-20
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
In Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. National Labor Relations Commission,[34] we clarified that the grant of separation pay may still be precluded even if the ground for the employee's dismissal is not serious misconduct under Article 282(a) of the Labor Code but other just causes under the same article and/or other authorized causes provided for under the Labor Code.  However, the TMPCWA case still recognized the social justice exception prescribed in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company.  To quote the relevant portions of that decision: Explicit in PLDT are two exceptions when the NLRC or the courts should not grant separation pay based on social justice¾serious misconduct (which is the first ground for dismissal under Art. 282) or acts that reflect on the moral character of the employee.  What is unclear is whether the ruling likewise precludes the grant of separation pay when the employee is validly terminated from work on grounds laid down in Art. 282 of the Labor Code other than serious misconduct.
2010-09-29
ABAD, J.
As regards the rank and file Union members, Article 264 of the Labor Code provides that termination from employment is not warranted by the mere fact that a union member has taken part in an illegal strike.  It must be shown that such a union member, clearly identified, performed an illegal act or acts during the strike.[20]
2010-07-05
BRION, J.
The union officers were answerable not only for resisting the Labor Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction and return-to-work orders; they were also liable for leading and instigating and, in the case of Figura, for participating in a work slowdown (during the CBA negotiations), a form of strike[69] undertaken by the union without complying with the mandatory legal requirements of a strike notice and strike vote. These acts are similarly prohibited activities.[70]
2010-06-18
PEREZ, J.
However, the succeeding case of Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association v. NLRC[25] reaffirmed the general rule that separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct, willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of trust, commission of a crime against the employer or his family, or those reflecting on his moral character. These five grounds are just causes for dismissal as provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code.
2008-11-11
VELASCO JR., J.
(1) [when it] is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees performing governmental functions; or (2) [when it] violates a specific requirement of law[, such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on the requisites of a valid strike]; or (3) [when it] is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to commit an unfair labor practice against non-union employees; or (4) [when it] employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as a widespread terrorism of non-strikers [for example, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code]; or (5) [when it] is declared in violation of an existing injunction[, such as injunction, prohibition, or order issued by the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of the Labor Code]; or (6) [when it] is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause.[18] With the foregoing parameters as guide and the following grounds as basis, we hold that the Union is liable for conducting an illegal strike for the following reasons: First, the Union's violation of the Hotel's Grooming Standards was clearly a deliberate and concerted action to undermine the authority of and to embarrass the Hotel and was, therefore, not a protected action. The appearances of the Hotel employees directly reflect the character and well-being of the Hotel, being a five-star hotel that provides service to top-notch clients.  Being bald or having cropped hair per se does not evoke negative or unpleasant feelings. The reality that a substantial number of employees assigned to the food and beverage outlets of the Hotel with full heads of hair suddenly decided to come to work bald-headed or with cropped hair, however, suggests that something is amiss and insinuates a sense that something out of the ordinary is afoot. Obviously, the Hotel does not need to advertise its labor problems with its clients. It can be gleaned from the records before us that the Union officers and members deliberately and in apparent concert shaved their heads or cropped their hair. This was shown by the fact that after coming to work on January 18, 2002, some Union members even had their heads shaved or their hair cropped at the Union office in the Hotel's basement. Clearly, the decision to violate the company rule on grooming was designed and calculated to place the Hotel management on its heels and to force it to agree to the Union's proposals.
2008-04-30
VELASCO JR., J.
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations Commission teaches that an employee validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or that which reflects adversely on the employee's moral character may be given financial assistance or severance pay.[33] Of similar tenor is Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. National Labor Relations Commission[34] where the Court, after a brief overview of relevant cases[35] dealing with the termination for any valid ground under Art. 282 of the Labor Code and where separation pay was not allowed, wrote:In all of the foregoing situations, the Court declined to grant termination pay because the causes for dismissal recognized under Art. 282 of the Labor Code were serious or grave in nature and attended by willful or wrongful intent or they reflected adversely on the moral character of the employees. We therefore find that in addition to serious misconduct, in dismissals based on other grounds under Art. 282 like willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of trust, and commission of a crime against the employer or his family, separation pay should not be conceded to the dismissed employee. (Emphasis ours.)