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PEOPLE v. RENATO DE GUZMAN Y MIRANDA

This case has been cited 10 times or more.

2012-02-22
BERSAMIN, J.
Discrediting Mendoza and Estaño as witnesses against Salafranca would be unwarranted. The RTC and the CA correctly concluded that Mendoza and Estaño were credible and reliable. The determination of the competence and credibility of witnesses at trial rested primarily with the RTC as the trial court due to its unique and unequalled position of observing their deportment during testimony, and of assessing their credibility and appreciating their truthfulness, honesty and candor. Absent a substantial reason to justify the reversal of the assessment made and conclusions reached by the RTC, the CA as the reviewing court was bound by such assessment and conclusions,[11] considering that the CA as the appellate court could neither substitute its assessment nor draw different conclusions without a persuasive showing that the RTC misappreciated the circumstances or omitted significant evidentiary matters that would alter the result.[12] Salafranca did not persuasively show a misappreciation or omission by the RTC. Hence, the Court, in this appeal, is in no position to undo or to contradict the findings of the RTC and the CA, which were entitled to great weight and respect.[13]
2011-09-28
PEREZ, J.
In People v. Gaspar[59] citing People v. De Guzman,[60] this Court held that "in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive on the part of the police officers."  In this case, appellant failed to overcome the aforesaid presumption. More telling is appellant's own admission that he only met the prosecution witnesses for the first time when he was arrested and that there was no bad blood between them.  This goes to show that the prosecution witnesses were not impelled with improper motive to falsely testify against appellant.
2011-07-13
CARPIO, J.
The presumption is that the policemen performed their official duties regularly.[12] In order to overcome this presumption, Imson must show that there was bad faith or improper motive on the part of the policemen, or that the confiscated items were tampered. Imson failed to do so.
2011-07-06
CARPIO, J.
Appellant asserts that it is unbelievable that he would be so foolish and reckless to offer to sell shabu to strangers. In People v. de Guzman,[14] we have ruled that peddlers of illicit drugs have been known, with ever increasing casualness and recklessness, to offer and sell their wares for the right price to anybody, be they strangers or not. What matters is not the existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller, or the time and venue of the sale, but the fact of agreement as well as the act constituting the sale and delivery of the prohibited drugs.
2010-08-08
MENDOZA, J.
The Court finds no compelling reason to reverse the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Settled is the rule that the findings and conclusion of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect because the trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify.[19] The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals as in this case.[20]
2010-07-06
BERSAMIN, J.
To begin with, it is fundamental that the determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well as great respect, if not conclusive effect.[23] Such determination made by the trial court proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude under grilling examination,[24] thereby placing the trial court in the unique position to assess the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor.[25]
2009-02-10
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The defense did not adduce any evidence that could have shown that the policemen deviated from the regular performance of their duty and that could have overcome this presumption. Neither did the defense interpose any evidence to show that said police officers were not performing their duty properly when the buy-bust operation was conducted. When the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation have no motive to falsely testify against the accused, the courts shall uphold the presumption that they have performed their duties regularly.[44] And unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary suggesting ill motive on the part of the police officers or deviation from the regular performance of their duties, their testimonies with respect to the operation deserve full faith and credit.[45] The presumption in favor of the prosecution witnesses, who are all police officers, taken together with the overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution against the accused, should therefore stand.
2008-11-27
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can easily be concocted but is difficult to prove.[66] In order to prosper, the defense of frame-up must be proved by the accused with clear and convincing evidence.[67]
2008-10-17
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.[24]
2008-10-17
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Absent any proof of motive to falsely accused him of such a grave offense, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses shall prevail over accused-appellant's bare allegation that he is a victim of frame-up.[54]