This case has been cited 22 times or more.
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2011-07-27 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| After the enactment R.A. 9346, [87] prohibiting the imposition of death penalty, questions arose as to the continued applicability of the Victor [88] ruling. Thus, in People v. Quiachon, [89] the Court pronounced that even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed because of R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity ex delicto of P75,000.00 still applies because this indemnity is not dependent on the actual imposition of death, but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the penalty of death attended the commission of the offense. [90] As explained in People v. Salome, [91] while R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the fact remains that the penalty provided for by the law for a heinous offense is still death, and the offense is still heinous. [92] (Emphasis supplied) | |||||
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2011-04-04 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, we grant to the heirs of Haide P75,000.00 as death indemnity;[59] P75,000.00 as moral damages;[60] and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.[61] As clarified in People v. Arbalate,[62] damages in such amounts are to be granted whenever the accused are adjudged guilty of a crime covered by Republic Act No. 7659, like the murder charged and proved herein. Indeed, the Court, observing in People v. Sarcia,[63] citing People v. Salome[64] and People v. Quiachon,[65] that the "principal consideration for the award of damages xxx is the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender," announced that: | |||||
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2010-12-15 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| As a result, courts now cannot impose the penalty of death. Instead, they have to impose reclusion perpetua. Despite this, the principal consideration for the award of damages, following the ruling in People v. Salome[47] and People v. Quiachon,[48] is "the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender."[49] | |||||
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2010-05-04 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| The fact that AAA did not immediately reveal that she was raped by appellant does not necessarily impair AAA's credibility. How the victim comported herself after the incident was not significant as it had nothing to do with the elements of the crime of rape.[22] Not all rape victims can be expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone. Different and varying degrees of behavioral responses are expected in the proximity of, or in confronting, an aberrant episode. It is settled that different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.[23] In People v. Luzorata,[24] we held: This Court indeed has not laid down any rule on how a rape victim should behave immediately after she has been abused. This experience is relative and may be dealt with in any way by the victim depending on the circumstances, but her credibility should not be tainted with any modicum of doubt. x x x. | |||||
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2009-10-02 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| The principal consideration for the award of damages, under the ruling in People v. Salome[33] and People v. Quiachon[34] is the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender. | |||||
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2008-12-04 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Finally, the Court of Appeals correctly increased the award of moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, in accordance with the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter.[17] | |||||
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2008-10-17 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Delay in reporting an incident of rape due to death threats and shame does not affect the credibility of the complainant nor undermine her charge of rape.[68] The silence of a rape victim or her failure to disclose her misfortune to the authorities without loss of material time does not prove that her charge is baseless and fabricated. It is a fact that the victim would rather privately bear the ignominy and pain of such an experience than reveal her shame to the world or risk the rapist's making good on his threat to hurt or kill her.[69] | |||||
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2008-10-10 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| Except for the award of moral damages the amount of which is increased from P50,000 to P75,000 conformably with current jurisprudence,[30] the Court affirms the modified penalty imposed by the appellate court. | |||||
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2008-06-30 |
TINGA, J, |
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| Appellant likewise attempts to cloud the credibility of AAA by pointing out that contrary to what the latter related in court, her act of willingly and voluntarily stripping her clothes, allowing appellant to have sexual knowledge of her for the second and third time, and failing to cry out for help at the time of the alleged rapes do tend to prove that she was not an unwilling victim. This argument must also fail for certainly, the circumstances under which appellant unleashed his bestial desires upon AAA necessarily subjected the latter to extreme psychological pressure. Considering that appellant ensured the cooperation, or at the very least the non-resistance, of AAA by using a knife and threats of physical harm coupled with the perversion of whatever moral ascendancy he as a father figure exercises over his hapless victim AAA cannot be expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone. For the same reason, she cannot be faulted for failing to offer resistance to appellant's advances. Physical resistance is immaterial in a rape case when the victim is sufficiently intimidated by her assailant and she submits against her will because of fear for her life or her personal safety. To reiterate, intimidation in rape assumes a relative interpretation and depends not only on the age, size and strength of the parties but also on their relationship with each other.[40] It is subjective as it is addressed to the mind of the victim and must therefore be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard-and-fast rule.[41] | |||||
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2008-06-25 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| [SEC.] 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended. [26] In accordance with the new law, Rep. Act No. 9346, the penalty imposed upon appellant Ranin should be reduced to reclusion perpetua, but he shall not be eligible for parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. [27] | |||||
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2008-02-26 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| In view, however, of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed into law on 24 June 2006, the imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited.[66] Thus, the penalty imposed upon appellants in Criminal case No. 98-0258 should be reduced to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility of parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.[67] | |||||
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2008-02-19 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| With the enactment, however, of Republic Act No. 9346, the imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited. Accordingly, this Court affirms the ruling of the appellate court that the penalty to be meted to appellant is reclusion perpetua. The same is in accordance with Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9346, and as provided under Section 3 of the said law, the appellant shall not be eligible for parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.[58] | |||||
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2007-06-08 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| As regards the civil liability of the accused, we affirm the appellate court's award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity. We increase the award of moral damages to P75,000.00, without need of proof, and additionally award P25,000.00 as exemplary damages consistent with current jurisprudence.[37] | |||||
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2007-04-13 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| (2) the award of exemplary damages is reduced, from P75,000 to P25,000, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence,[19] but moral damages should also be awarded in the amount of P75,000.[20] No pronouncement as to costs. | |||||
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2007-04-04 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| As a rule, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally accorded the highest degree of weight and respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the unique opportunity to observe the deportment of witnesses while testifying.[12] | |||||
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2007-02-08 |
TINGA, J. |
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| The appellate court correctly rejected the defense of alibi set up by appellant. For alibi to be credible, the accused must not only prove his presence at another place at the time of the commission of the offense but must also demonstrate that it would be physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at that time.[25] In the case at bar, appellant claims that he was in Mabitac, which was seven (7) kilometers away from the locus criminis. The appellate court noted that it was not impossible for appellant to traverse this distance. Moreover, his alibi is uncorroborated. Alibi is a weak defense in light of the positive identification by an eyewitness to the offense.[26] Norma categorically identified appellant as the man who shot her husband. She testified, thus:FISCAL MANGROBANG: | |||||
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2006-12-06 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Private complainant is being faulted for not taking the necessary measures to prevent a recurrence of her horrible experience with accused-appellant last 24 December 1999. Her failure to perform what accused-appellant claims she ought to have done cannot be taken against her. A fourteen-year old girl cannot be reasonably expected to exercise or put into place any measure that would avert the repetition of the ordeal with her father. How the victim comported herself after the incident was not significant as it had nothing to do with the elements of the crime of rape.[22] Not all victims can be expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone. Different and varying degrees of behavioral responses are expected in the proximity of, or in confronting, an aberrant episode. It is settled that different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.[23] The workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable.[24] This Court, in People v. Luzorata,[25] held:This Court indeed has not laid down any rule on how a rape victim should behave immediately after she has been abused. This experience is relative and may be dealt with in any way by the victim depending on the circumstances, but her credibility should not be tainted with any modicum of doubt x x x. | |||||
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2006-10-31 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| (b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code. Section 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended. Accordingly, the penalty to be meted on appellant is reclusion perpetua in accordance with Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9346, and as provided under Section 3 of the said law, the appellant shall not be eligible for parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.[41] | |||||
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2006-09-26 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The fact that private complainant acted as if nothing horrible happened to her does not warrant appellant's exoneration. How the victim comported herself after the incident was not significant as it had nothing to do with the elements of the crime of rape.[24] Not all victims can be expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone. Different and varying degrees of behavioral responses are expected in the proximity of, or in confronting, an aberrant episode. It is settled that different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.[25] The workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable.[26] This Court, in People v. Luzorata,[27] held:This Court indeed has not laid down any rule on how a rape victim should behave immediately after she has been abused. This experience is relative and may be dealt with in any way by the victim depending on the circumstances, but her credibility should not be tainted with any modicum of doubt x x x. | |||||
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2006-09-20 |
TINGA, J. |
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| In view, however, of Republic Act No. 9346, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole should instead be imposed.[66] | |||||
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2006-09-19 |
TINGA, J. |
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| As regards the civil liability of Cabalquinto, we affirm the award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count and additionally award AAA P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count consistent with current jurisprudence.[40] Moral damages, separate and distinct from the civil indemnity, are automatically granted in rape cases. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are imposed to deter fathers with aberrant sexual behaviors from sexually abusing their daughters.[41] | |||||
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2006-09-08 |
TINGA, J. |
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| In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court affirms the award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and increases the Court of Appeals' award of moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.[58] | |||||