This case has been cited 12 times or more.
2015-07-20 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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Indeed, under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect.[17] Like any other rule, however, there are recognized exceptions to this general rule such as (1) the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, (2) void judgments, and (3) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.[18] | |||||
2014-06-18 |
BRION, J. |
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The petitioners entreat the Court to rectify the situation "if only to forestall a bad precedent to debase the sanctity of final and executory judgments."[23] They urge that the doctrine of immutability of final judgments be respected in their case They tell the Court that the "supervening event" PHIMCO raised at this point in the proceedings does not fall under any of the exceptions to the doctrine and these are: the correction of clerical errors, the so called nunc pro tune entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and circumstances which transpire after the finality of the decision and which render the execution unjust and inequitable.[24] | |||||
2014-03-12 |
ABAD, J. |
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Moreover, Bandag's claim that petitioners committed a wrongdoing is rooted in provisions contained in the void SFAs. The SFAs, however, do not govern petitioners' employer-employee relationship with Bandag. It is elementary that a void contract produces no effect; it does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation; it cannot be the source of rights.[92] | |||||
2014-01-15 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good."[19] Unjust enrichment exists, according to Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc.,[20] "when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity | |||||
2013-02-27 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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Petitioner argues that the sheriff, whose duty was merely ministerial, properly implemented the writ of execution issued by the RTC. Thus, the implementation of the writ should be respected. Petitioner cites Hulst v. P.R. Builders,[18] in which this Court ruled that the sheriff properly proceeded with the auction sale despite the objection of the judgment debtor. The latter had objected that the property being sold had a value higher than that of the judgment debt that had to be satisfied. We held in that case that because the duty of the sheriff was ministerial, he had no discretion to postpone the conduct of the auction sale of the levied properties. Applying that ruling, petitioner herein is now similarly asserting in this case that the sheriff properly proceeded with the ministerial duty of the latter, whose implementation of the writ of execution should therefore be respected. Thus, petitioner now asserts that the auction sale pursuant to the execution was valid and cannot be undone. Consequently, the issue in the main case has supposedly become moot and academic. | |||||
2012-02-01 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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In Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc.,[21] we further elaborated on this principle: [G]ross inadequacy of price does not nullify an execution sale. In an ordinary sale, for reason of equity, a transaction may be invalidated on the ground of inadequacy of price, or when such inadequacy shocks one's conscience as to justify the courts to interfere; such does not follow when the law gives the owner the right to redeem as when a sale is made at public auction, upon the theory that the lesser the price, the easier it is for the owner to effect redemption. When there is a right to redeem, inadequacy of price should not be material because the judgment debtor may re-acquire the property or else sell his right to redeem and thus recover any loss he claims to have suffered by reason of the price obtained at the execution sale. Thus, respondent stood to gain rather than be harmed by the low sale value of the auctioned properties because it possesses the right of redemption. x x x[22] (Emphasis supplied.) | |||||
2011-12-07 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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In Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., [26] we reiterated that: [G]ross inadequacy of price does not nullify an execution sale. In an ordinary sale, for reason of equity, a transaction may be invalidated on the ground of inadequacy of price, or when such inadequacy shocks one's conscience as to justify the courts to interfere; such does not follow when the law gives the owner the right to redeem as when a sale is made at public auction, upon the theory that the lesser the price, the easier it is for the owner to effect redemption. When there is a right to redeem, inadequacy of price should not be material because the judgment debtor may re-acquire the property or else sell his right to redeem and thus recover any loss he claims to have suffered by reason of the price obtained at the execution sale. Thus, respondent stood to gain rather than be harmed by the low sale value of the auctioned properties because it possesses the right of redemption. x x x. [27] | |||||
2010-02-05 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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The April 27, 1999 HLURB Resolution,[27] reinstating the December 18, 1996 Decision,[28] has long been final and executory. Nothing is more settled in the law than that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it was made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.[29] The only recognized exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.[30] None of the exceptions is present in this case. The HLURB decision cannot be considered a void judgment, as it was rendered by a tribunal with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint and, as discussed above, with jurisdiction over the parties. Hence, the same can no longer be modified. | |||||
2009-09-29 |
PERALTA, J. |
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In questioning the jurisdiction of the CA over the petition for certiorari filed by respondent Financiera, petitioner Valdez claims the following: (a) as jurisprudence[26] dictates, the proper remedy of the same respondent should have been to file an appeal, because it was the motion for execution of judgment that was denied; (b) the petition for certiorari was filed out of time, because respondent Financiera received the RTC Order of June 18, 2007 denying the latter's motion for reconsideration on June 29, 2007, but instead of filing a notice of appeal within the reglementary period lasting until July 14, 2007, respondent Financiera belatedly filed a petition for certiorari on August 28, 2007 when the questioned RTC Orders had already attained finality; (c) the final RTC Orders should not have been modified because, as ruled by this Court in a number of cases,[27] the said Orders are immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification was meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it was made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land; and (d) the subject matter of the petition for certiorari should not have been expanded, since the only subject matter elevated by respondent Financiera was that of SPPI Investment Account No. A-04-000-355 with a cash value of P110,000.00, and not the entire P10,195,833.33 unpaid claim under the Compromise Agreement, contrary to the pronouncement of this Court in various cases[28] that the nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the material allegations contained in the petition. | |||||
2009-07-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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The above-quoted article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the provisions of which were formulated as "basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order; designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience; [are] guides for human conduct that should run as golden threads through society to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice." There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person retains the money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.[32] | |||||
2008-09-30 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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We do not agree. It is settled that when there is a right to redeem, inadequacy of price is of no moment, for the reason that the judgment debtor always has the chance to redeem and reacquire the property. In fact, the property may be sold for less than its fair market value, precisely because the lesser the price, the easier for the owner to effect a redemption.[81] In Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., [82] the Court ruled:[G]ross inadequacy of price does not nullify an execution sale. In an ordinary sale, for reason of equity, a transaction may be invalidated on the ground of inadequacy of price, or when such inadequacy shocks one's conscience as to justify the courts to interfere; such does not follow when the law gives the owner the right to redeem as when a sale is made at public auction, upon the theory that the lesser the price, the easier it is for the owner to effect redemption. When there is a right to redeem, inadequacy of price should not be material because the judgment debtor may re-acquire the property or else sell his right to redeem and thus recover any loss he claims to have suffered by reason of the price obtained at the execution sale. Thus, respondent stood to gain rather than be harmed by the low sale value of the auctioned properties because it possesses the right of redemption. x x x. | |||||
2008-05-07 |
CARPIO, J. |
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Labor Arbiter Layawen's decision is already final and executory and can no longer be the subject of an appeal. Thus, petitioner is bound by the decision and can no longer impugn the same.[8] Indeed, well-settled is the rule that a decision that has attained finality can no longer be modified even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law.[9] The doctrine of finality of judgment is explained in Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo:[10] |