This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2013-12-11 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| With particular reference to an extra-judicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale may apply ex parte with the RTC of the province or place where the property or any part of it is situated, to give the purchaser possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor should it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of Act No. 3135; and the RTC, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession be issued, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall then execute said order immediately.[15] We underscore that the application for a writ of possession by the purchaser in a foreclosure sale conducted under Act No. 3135 is ex parte and summary in nature, brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice being sent by the court to any person adverse in interest. The relief is granted even without giving an opportunity to be heard to the person against whom the relief is sought.[16] Its nature as an ex parte petition under Act No. 3135, as amended, renders the application for the issuance of a writ of possession a non-litigious proceeding.[17] Indeed, the grant of the writ of possession is but a ministerial act on the part of the issuing court, because its issuance is a matter of right on the part of the purchaser.[18] The judge issuing the order for the granting of the writ of possession pursuant to the express provisions of Act No. 3135 cannot be charged with having acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.[19] | |||||
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2012-10-01 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Having purchased the subject realties at public auction on 7 November 2001, Metrobank undoubtedly acquired ownership over the same when TCEI failed to exercise its right of redemption within the three-month period prescribed under the foregoing provision. With ownership already vested in its favor as of 6 February 2002, it matters little that Metrobank caused the certificate of sale to be registered with the Cavite Provincial Registry only on 10 April 2002 and/or executed an affidavit consolidating its ownership over the same properties only on 25 April 2003. The rule is settled that the mortgagor loses all interest over the foreclosed property after the expiration of the redemption period and the purchaser becomes the absolute owner thereof when no redemption is made.[36] By the time that the Rehabilitation Court issued the 8 October 2002 Stay Order in SEC Case No. 023-02, it cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that Metrobank had long acquired ownership over the subject realties. | |||||
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2010-11-22 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| The law does not require that a petition for a writ of possession be granted only after documentary and testimonial evidence shall have been offered to and admitted by the court.[35] As long as a verified petition states the facts sufficient to entitle petitioner to the relief requested, the court shall issue the writ prayed for.[36] | |||||
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2010-11-15 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Alfredo is assailing the validity of the RTC Order dated March 28, 2006, which granted the Bank's Urgent Ex Parte Motion To Resolve Motion for Designation of Another Sheriff to Serve/Enforce Writ of Possession/Court Processes. It is to be noted that the said Order was but an ancillary motion emanating from the writ of possession granted earlier by the RTC. Corollarily, with regard to a petition for writ of possession, it is well to state that the proceeding is ex parte and summary in nature. It is a judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to any person adverse of interest. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the person against whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard.[50] Consequently, so too was the nature of the urgent motion, it was ex-parte and summary in nature. | |||||
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2010-03-02 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Here in the present case, we similarly reject petitioners' contention that the trial court should have conducted a trial prior to issuing the Order denying their motion to intervene.[42] As it is, the law does not require that a petition for a writ of possession may be granted only after documentary and testimonial evidence shall have been offered to and admitted by the court.[43] As long as a verified petition states the facts sufficient to entitle the petitioner to the relief requested, the court shall issue the writ prayed for. There is no need for petitioners to offer any documentary or testimonial evidence for the court to grant the petition.[44] | |||||
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2009-07-03 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| It is also unmistakable that the trial court, in which jurisdiction over applications for writs of possession is by law vested, had acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondent's application merely upon its filing. And since it had so acquired jurisdiction over the incidents of the application, it was then bound to act on it and issue the writ prayed for inasmuch as that duty is essentially ministerial.[48] The purported errors that it may have incidentally committed do not negate the fact that it had, in the first place, acquired the authority to dispose of the application and that it had since retained such authority until the assailed orders were issued. Such errors, if indeed there were, are nevertheless mere errors of judgment which are correctible by an ordinary appeal before the Court of Appeals,[49] a remedy that was then available to petitioner, and not by a petition for annulment under Rule 47. Furthermore, the order granting a petition for a writ of possession is a final order from which an appeal would be the proper and viable remedy.[50] | |||||