This case has been cited 6 times or more.
|
2015-02-03 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
||||
| For sure, the Court cannot jettison the presumption of good faith in this or in any other case. The presumption is a matter of law. It has had a long history. Indeed, good faith has long been established as a legal principle even in the heydays of the Roman Empire.[51] In Soriano v. Marcelo,[52] citing Collantes v. Marcelo,[53] the Court emphasizes the necessity of the presumption of good faith, thus:Well-settled is the rule that good faith is always presumed and the Chapter on Human Relations of the Civil Code directs every person, inter alia, to observe good faith which springs from the fountain of good conscience. Specifically, a public officer is presumed to have acted in good faith in the performance of his duties. Mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. "Bad faith" does not simply connote bad moral judgment or negligence. There must be some dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will. It partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior purposes. | |||||
|
2010-11-24 |
BRION, J. |
||||
| that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.[29] | |||||
|
2009-07-13 |
CARPIO, J. |
||||
| And, as we explained in Collantes v. Marcelo,[11] | |||||
|
2008-12-18 |
NACHURA, J. |
||||
| Of course, this rule is not absolute. The aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when the finding of the Ombudsman is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as what the petitioner did in this case, consistent with our ruling in Collantes v. Marcelo,[25] where we laid down the following exceptions to the rule: When necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; | |||||
|
2008-06-18 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| The elements of the offense of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, enumerated in Collantes v. Marcelo,[11] are as follows:x x x 1) [T]he accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and 3) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. Evidently, mere bad faith or partiality and negligence per se are not enough for one to be held liable under the law, since the act constitutive of bad faith or partiality must, in the first place, be evident or manifest, respectively, while the negligent deed should be both gross and inexcusable. It is further required that any or all of these modalities ought to result in undue injury to a specified party.[12] | |||||
|
2008-03-14 |
NACHURA, J. |
||||
| Case law has it that the determination of probable cause against those in public office during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman.[16] The Ombudsman is empowered to determine, in the exercise of his discretion, whether probable cause exists, and to charge the person believed to have committed the crime as defined by law. As a rule, courts should not interfere with the Ombudsman's investigatory power, exercised through the Ombudsman Prosecutors, and the authority to determine the presence or absence of probable cause, except when the finding is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[17] | |||||