This case has been cited 7 times or more.
2012-10-09 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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In Chavez v. National Housing Authority,[35] the Court held that pending the enactment of an enabling law, the release of information through postings in public bulletin boards and government websites satisfies the constitutional requirement, thus: It is unfortunate, however, that after almost twenty (20) years from birth of the 1987 Constitution, there is still no enabling law that provides the mechanics for the compulsory duty of government agencies to disclose information on government transactions. Hopefully, the desired enabling law will finally see the light of day if and when Congress decides to approve the proposed "Freedom of Access to Information Act." In the meantime, it would suffice that government agencies post on their bulletin boards the documents incorporating the information on the steps and negotiations that produced the agreements and the agreements themselves, and if finances permit, to upload said information on their respective websites for easy access by interested parties. Without any law or regulation governing the right to disclose information, the NHA or any of the respondents cannot be faulted if they were not able to disclose information relative to the SMDRP to the public in general.[36] (Emphasis supplied.) | |||||
2012-10-09 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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Consistent with this policy, the EPIRA was enacted to provide for "an orderly and transparent privatization" of NPC's assets and liabilities.[30] Specifically, said law mandated that "[a]ll assets of NPC shall be sold in an open and transparent manner through public bidding."[31] | |||||
2012-01-24 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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The Court had the following disquisition on the concept of the Operative Fact Doctrine in the case of Chavez v. National Housing Authority:[173] | |||||
2011-07-05 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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That the operative fact doctrine squarely applies to executive acts--in this case, the approval by PARC of the HLI proposal for stock distribution--is well-settled in our jurisprudence. In Chavez v. National Housing Authority, [163] We held: Petitioner postulates that the "operative fact" doctrine is inapplicable to the present case because it is an equitable doctrine which could not be used to countenance an inequitable result that is contrary to its proper office. | |||||
2011-07-05 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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General jurisdiction over agrarian disputes over stock distribution agreements necessarily implies a specific authority to monitor and enforce implementation of the same. As distinguished from express powers, implied powers are those that can be inferred or are implicit in the wordings or conferred by necessary or fair implication of the enabling act. [185] Public respondents correctly identified the explanation of Chavez v. National Housing Authority, [186] on the doctrine of necessary implication in administrative law, in this wise: Basic in administrative law is the doctrine that a government agency or office has express and implied powers based on its charter and other pertinent statutes. Express powers are those powers granted, allocated, and delegated to a government agency or office by express provisions of law. On the other hand, implied powers are those that can be inferred or are implicit in the wordings of the law or conferred by necessary or fair implication in the enabling act. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, the Court clarified and stressed that when a general grant of power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred by necessary implication. It was also explicated that when the statute does not specify the particular method to be followed or used by a government agency in the exercise of the power vested in it by law, said agency has the authority to adopt any reasonable method to carry out its functions. (Emphasis supplied) | |||||
2011-07-05 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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While the ponencia claims that the application of the doctrine of operative facts to executive issuances is well-settled in our jurisprudence, the ponente relies on only two cases to support this claim City Government of Makati v. Civil Service Commission, [264] and Chavez v. National Housing Authority, R-II Builders, Inc., et al. [265] In both instances, clear considerations of equity were present. | |||||
2009-04-02 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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Two days after, petitioner Romero II filed a Manifestation with Urgent Plea for a TRO[6] alleging, among others, that: (1) he answered questions concerning the investments of OWWA funds in the Smokey Mountain project and how much of OWWA's original investment had already been paid; (2) when Senator Estrada called on Atty. Francisco I. Chavez, as resource person, the latter spoke of the facts and issues he raised with the Court in Chavez v. National Housing Authority,[7] none of which were related to the subject of the inquiry; and (3) when Senator Estrada adjourned the investigation, he asked petitioners Romero II and Canlas to return at the resumption of the investigation. |