This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2009-10-26 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| As this Court has repeatedly declared, Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes thereof manifest themselves. Article 36 refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. The malady must be so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[13] | |||||
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2009-08-14 |
BRION, J. |
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| These Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos. To reiterate, psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.[31] These requisites must be strictly complied with, as the grant of a petition for nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Furthermore, since the Family Code does not define "psychological incapacity," fleshing out its terms is left to us to do so on a case-to-case basis through jurisprudence.[32] We emphasized this approach in the recent case of Ting v. Velez-Ting[33] when we explained: It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. | |||||