This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2012-04-25 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| It must be stressed, however, that indirect contempt proceedings partake of the nature of a criminal prosecution; hence, strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions also apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt; the accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases; and proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed.[23] Moreover, in contempt proceedings, if the answer to the contempt charge is satisfactory, the contempt proceedings end.[24] | |||||
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2010-10-12 |
PER CURIAM |
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| The records do not indicate that complainant was afforded an opportunity to rebut the charges against him. Respondent judge should have conducted a hearing in order to provide complainant the opportunity to adduce before the court documentary or testimonial evidence in his behalf. The hearing also allows the court a more thorough evaluation of the circumstances surrounding the case, including the chance to observe the accused present his side in open court and subject his defense to interrogation from the complainants or from the court itself.[34] | |||||
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2008-09-04 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Respondent Committees argue as if this were the first time the presumption in favor of the presidential communications privilege is mentioned and adopted in our legal system. That is far from the truth. The Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez,[12] affirmed that the presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution. Even Senate v. Ermita,[13] the case relied upon by respondent Committees, reiterated this concept. There, the Court enumerated the cases in which the claim of executive privilege was recognized, among them Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),[14] and Chavez v. PEA.[15] The Court articulated in these cases that "there are certain types of information which the government may withhold from the public,[16]" that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters";[17] and that "the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as `privileged information' under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings."[18] | |||||