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RODELIA S. FUNGO v. LOURDES SCHOOL OF MANDALUYONG

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

	GR No. 174631 2011-10-19	JHORIZALDY UY v. CENTRO CERAMICA CORPORATION VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Resignation is defined as"the voluntary act of employees who are compelled by personal reasons to disassociate themselves from their employment. It must be done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of abandonment."[15] In this case, the evidence on record suggests that petitioner did not resign; he was orally dismissed by Sy. It is this lack of clear, valid and legal cause, not to mention due process, that made his dismissal illegal, warranting reinstatement and the award of backwages.[16] Moreover, the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal just three weeks later is difficult to reconcile with voluntary resignation. Had petitioner intended to voluntarily relinquish his employment after being unceremoniously dismissed by no less than the company president, he would not have sought redress from the NLRC and vigorously pursued this case against the respondents.[17]
	GR No. 157861 2010-02-02	BIBIANA FARMS v. ARTURO LADO BRION, J.
In. Fungo v. Lourdes School of Mandaluyong,[31] we restated the guidelines for the application of loss of trust and confidence as a just cause for dismissal of an employee from the service, thus: x x x a) loss of confidence should not be simulated; b) it should not be used as subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified; c) it may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; and d) it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith.
	GR No. 176040 2009-09-04	CASA CEBUANA INCORPORADA v. IRENEO P. LEUTERIO YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
In Fungo v. Lourdes School of Mandaluyong,[19] we defined resignation as "the voluntary act of employees who are compelled by personal reasons to disassociate themselves from their employment. It must be done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of abandonment."[20] In this case, the evidence on record suggests that respondent did not voluntarily resign. The more logical conclusion, based on the evidence, is that respondent was then being forced or pressured to resign, which is tantamount to illegal dismissal.
	GR No. 175345 2009-08-19	BALTAZAR L. PAYNO v. ORIZON TRADING CORP. NACHURA, J.
In this case, we find no overt act on the part of petitioner that he was ready to sever his employment ties. The alleged resignation was actually premised by respondents only on the filing of the complaint for separation pay, but this alone is not sufficient proof that petitioner intended to resign from the company. What strongly negates the claim of resignation is the fact that petitioner filed the amended complaint for illegal dismissal immediately after he was not allowed to report for work on June 3, 2000. Resignation is inconsistent with the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal.[11] It would have been illogical for petitioner to resign and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal later on.[12] If petitioner was determined to resign, as respondents posited, he would not have commenced the action for illegal dismissal. Undeniably, petitioner was unceremoniously dismissed in this case.
	GR No. 160940 2008-07-21	MEGAFORCE SECURITY AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
There is constructive dismissal if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it would foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment.[20] It exists where there is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay.[21]
	GR NO. 150173 2007-09-05	GARING v. HEIRS OF MARCOS SILVA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Time and again, we have held that this Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its function to examine and evaluate the probative value of the evidence presented before the concerned tribunal upon which its impugned decision or resolution is based.[6] In an appeal to this Court by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended, only questions of law may be raised.[7] In the exercise of its power of review, the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding.[8] Thus, it is not its function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again.[9]