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ROMEO P. GERICHI v. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE)

This case has been cited 9 times or more.

	GR No. 212825 2015-12-07	CIR v. NEXT MOBILE VELASCO JR., J.
Here, to uphold the validity of the Waivers would be consistent with the public policy embodied in the principle that taxes are the lifeblood of the government, and their prompt and certain availability is an imperious need.[19] Taxes are the nation's lifeblood through which government agencies continue to operate and which the State discharges its functions for the welfare of its constituents.[20] As between the parties, it would be more equitable if petitioner's lapses were allowed to pass and consequently uphold the Waivers in order to support this principle and public policy.
	GR No. 203335 2014-02-18	JOSE JESUS M. DISINI v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ABAD, J.
In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.[103]
	GR No. 175356 2013-12-03	MANILA MEMORIAL PARK v. SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE DEL CASTILLO, J.
Police power is the inherent power of the State to regulate or to restrain the use of liberty and property for public welfare.[58] The only limitation is that the restriction imposed should be reasonable, not oppressive.[59] In other words, to be a valid exercise of police power, it must have a lawful subject or objective and a lawful method of accomplishing the goal.[60] Under the police power of the State, "property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government."[61] The State "may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare [as long as] the interference [is] reasonable and not arbitrary."[62] Eminent domain, on the other hand, is the inherent power of the State to take or appropriate private property for public use.[63] The Constitution, however, requires that private property shall not be taken without due process of law and the payment of just compensation.[64]
	GR No. 175356 2013-12-03	MANILA MEMORIAL PARK v. SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE DEL CASTILLO, J.
To put it differently, a private establishment that merely breaks even without the discounts yet will surely start to incur losses because of such discounts. The same effect is expected if its mark-up is less than 20 percent, and if all its sales come from retail purchases by senior citizens. Aside from the observation we have already raised earlier, it will also be grossly unfair to an establishment if the discounts will be treated merely as deductions from either its gross income or its gross sales. Operating at a loss through no fault of its own, it will realize that the tax credit limitation under RR 2-94 is inutile, if not improper. Worse, profit-generating businesses will be put in a better position if they avail themselves of tax credits denied those that are losing, because no taxes are due from the latter.[42] (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
	GR No. 181704 2011-12-06	BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION MR. ROMULO A. PAGULAYAN v. MARGARITO B. TEVES VILLARAMA, JR., J.
The rationale for the aforementioned exception was clearly explained in our ruling in Gerochi v. Department of Energy,[31] to wit: In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to this principle. Given the volume and variety of interactions in today's society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies -- the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their specialized fields -- the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies. All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These requirements are denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.[32]
	GR Nos. 156556-57 2011-10-04	ENRIQUE U. BETOY v. BOARD OF DIRECTORS PERALTA, J.
The Constitutionality of Section 34 of the EPIRA has already been passed upon by this Court in Gerochi v. Department of Energy,[39] to wit: Finally, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. Indubitably, petitioners failed to overcome this presumption in favor of the EPIRA. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would warrant a pronouncement that Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and Rule 18 of its IRR are unconstitutional and void.[40]
	GR No. 193247 2011-09-14	SERGIO I. CARBONILLA v. BOARD OF AIRLINES REPRESENTATIVES CARPIO, J.
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals that Section 3506 of the TCCP failed the completeness and sufficient standard tests. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.[39] The second test requires adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.[40] Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Section 3506 of the TCCP complied with these requirements. The law is complete in itself that it leaves nothing more for the BOC to do: it gives authority to the Collector to assign customs employees to do overtime work; the Commissioner of Customs fixes the rates; and it provides that the payments shall be made by the importers, shippers or other persons served. Section 3506 also fixed the standard to be followed by the Commissioner of Customs when it provides that the rates shall not be less than that prescribed by law to be paid to employees of private enterprise.
	GR No. 173863 2010-09-15	CHEVRON PHILIPPINES v. BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VILLARAMA, JR., J.
In distinguishing tax and regulation as a form of police power, the determining factor is the purpose of the implemented measure. If the purpose is primarily to raise revenue, then it will be deemed a tax even though the measure results in some form of regulation. On the other hand, if the purpose is primarily to regulate, then it is deemed a regulation and an exercise of the police power of the state, even though incidentally, revenue is generated. Thus, in Gerochi v. Department of Energy,[24] the Court stated: The conservative and pivotal distinction between these two (2) powers rests in the purpose for which the charge is made. If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax.
	GR No. 177597 2008-07-16	BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City)."[9]