This case has been cited 8 times or more.
|
2014-08-19 |
MENDOZA, J. |
||||
| The Court agrees with the JBC that a writ of mandamus is not available. "Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.[17] There is no question that the JBC's duty to nominate is discretionary and it may not be compelled to do something. | |||||
|
2010-07-02 |
PERALTA, J. |
||||
| Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.[53] | |||||
|
2008-11-11 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
||||
| Since the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested, the rule in statutory construction is that all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.[31] | |||||
|
2007-07-27 |
NACHURA, J. |
||||
| It is possible for a substantive matter to be nonetheless embodied in a rule of procedure, and to a certain extent, Rule 67 does contain matters of substance. Yet the absorption of the substantive point into a procedural rule does not prevent the substantive right from being superseded or amended by statute, for the creation of property rights is a matter for the legislature to enact on, and not for the courts to decide upon. Indeed, if the position of the Government is sustained, it could very well lead to the absurd situation wherein the judicial branch of government may shield laws with the veneer of irrepealability simply by absorbing the provisions of law into the rules of procedure. When the 1987 Constitution restored to the judicial branch of government the sole prerogative to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it should be understood that such rules necessarily pertain to points of procedure, and not points of substantive law. It is a well-entrenched principle that statutes, including administrative rules and regulations, operate prospectively unless the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest by express terms or by necessary implication[24] because the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested.[25] This is based on the Latin maxim: Lex prospicit non respicit (the law looks forward, not backward). | |||||
|
2007-04-27 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
||||
| Irrefragably, in the instant case, respondent's term as General Manager of TWD merely expired when the Board passed Resolution No. 49, Series of 1996 on August 31, 1996. This is consonant with the following ruling of this Court in Paloma v. Mora,[28] a case which also involves a general manager of a water district:In the case at bar, P.D. No. 198, otherwise known as THE PROVINCIAL WATER UTILITIES ACT OF 1973, which was promulgated on 25 May 1973, categorically provides that the general manager shall serve at the pleasure of the board of directors, viz: | |||||
|
2007-03-02 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.[31] | |||||
|
2006-07-20 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
||||
| Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty.[30] A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.[31] When an official is required and authorized to do a prescribed act upon a prescribed contingency, his functions are ministerial only, and mandamus may be issued to control his action upon the happening of the contingency.[32] | |||||
|
2006-06-30 |
GARCIA, J. |
||||
| At its most basic, what the petitioner asks is for the Court to delve into the policy behind or wisdom of a statute, i.e., B.P. Blg. 22, which, under the doctrine of separation of powers, it cannot do, matters of legislative wisdom being within the domain of Congress.[5] Even with the best of motives, the Court can only interpret and apply the law and cannot, despite doubts about its wisdom, amend or repeal it. Courts of justice have no right to encroach on the prerogatives of lawmakers, as long as it has not been shown that they have acted with grave abuse of discretion. And while the judiciary may interpret laws and evaluate them for constitutional soundness and to strike them down if they are proven to be infirm, this solemn power and duty do not include the discretion to correct by reading into the law what is not written therein.[6] | |||||