This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2012-03-20 |
SERENO, J. |
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| It bears stressing that the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. This exclusive jurisdiction includes the power to determine whether it has the authority to hear and determine the controversy presented; and the right to decide whether there exists that state of facts that confers jurisdiction, as well as all other matters arising from the case legitimately before it.[25] Accordingly, the HRET has the power to hear and determine, or inquire into, the question of its own jurisdiction - both as to parties and as to subject matter; and to decide all questions, whether of law or of fact, the decision of which is necessary to determine the question of jurisdiction.[26] Thus, the HRET had the exclusive jurisdiction to determine its authority and to take cognizance of the Election Protest filed before it. | |||||
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2009-10-02 |
BRION, J. |
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| Being an immutable decision, COMELEC Resolution No. 99-1067 may no longer be modified, altered or changed. CSC Resolution No. 011396 which modified a final and executory judgment is a void judgment. As such, it is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication.[34] Thus, CSC Resolution No. 011396 finding the petitioner guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and the consequent penalty of dismissal from the service is rendered ineffectual. The petitioner is entitled to full backwages from the time he has duly served his six-month suspension under COMELEC Resolution No. 99-1067 until his actual reinstatement. | |||||
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2009-04-29 |
TINGA, J. |
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| This Court's position was soundly rejected by the legislature when it enacted the Revised Penal Code in 1930. A more exacting rule on prescription was embodied in the Code, Article 91 of which was plain and categorical: "The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago." Besides, it must be noted that even the cases involving liberal interpretation of the statute of limitations in favor of the accused relate only to the following issues: (1) retroactive[13] or prospective[14] application of laws providing or extending the prescriptive period; (2) the determination of the nature of the felony committed vis a vis the applicable prescriptive period;[15] and (3) the reckoning of when the prescriptive period runs.[16] Thus, contrary to the opinion of the majority in Romualdez, these cases are no authority to support the conclusion that the prescriptive period in a special law runs while the accused is abroad. | |||||
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2007-02-06 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| The Court notes that the CA, indeed, failed to resolve petitioners' prayer for the issuance of the writ of prohibition, which, significantly, focuses on the alleged nullity of the DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995. On this score, the CA found that the application for the issuance of the writ of prohibition was actually a collateral attack on the validity of the DARAB decision. But, a final and executory judgment may be set aside in three ways;[39] and a collateral attack, whereby in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof,[40] is one of these. This tenet is based upon a court's inherent authority to expunge void acts from its records.[41] Despite recognizing the need to resolve petitioners' application for the writ of prohibition in its Resolution dated January 12, 1999, the CA nonetheless summarily denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated February 23, 2000,[42] leaving the matter hanging and unresolved. | |||||