This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2009-12-14 |
CORONA, J. |
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| This issue is far from novel. We resolved the same question as early as 1999 in Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. v. NLRC[19] and since then, we have reiterated the ruling in several other cases.[20] | |||||
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2009-01-20 |
PUNO, C.J. |
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| In light of these powers, the reason for suspending actions for claims against the corporation should not be difficult to discover. It is not really to enable the management committee or the rehabilitation receiver to substitute the defendant in any pending action against it before any court, tribunal, board or body. Obviously, the real justification is to enable the management committee or rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its/his powers free from any judicial or extra-judicial interference that might unduly hinder or prevent the "rescue" of the debtor company. To allow such other action to continue would only add to the burden of the management committee or rehabilitation receiver, whose time, effort and resources would be wasted in defending claims against the corporation instead of being directed toward its restructuring and rehabilitation.[19] | |||||
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2008-12-10 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| The justification for the suspension of actions or claims, without distinction, pending rehabilitation proceedings is to enable the management committee or rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its/his powers free from any judicial or extra-judicial interference that might unduly hinder or prevent the "rescue" of the debtor company. To allow such other actions to continue would only add to the burden of the management committee or rehabilitation receiver, whose time, effort and resources would be wasted in defending claims against the corporation instead of being directed toward its restructuring and rehabilitation.[39] | |||||