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PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INDUSTRIAL BANK v. PEDRO L. CABRERA

This case has been cited 4 times or more.

	GR No. 192571 2014-04-22	ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. PEARLIE ANN F. ALCARAZ PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
As a final point, Alcaraz cannot take refuge in Aliling v. Feliciano[12] (Aliling) since the same is not squarely applicable to the case at bar. The employee in Aliling, a sales executive, was belatedly informed of his quota requirement. Thus, considering the nature of his position, the fact that he was not informed of his sales quota at the time of his engagement changed the complexion of his employment. Contrarily, the nature of Alcaraz's duties and responsibilities as Regulatory Affairs Manager negates the application of the foregoing. Records show that Alcaraz was terminated because she (a) did not manage her time effectively; (b) failed to gain the trust of her staff and to build an effective rapport with them; (c) failed to train her staff effectively; and (d) was not able to obtain the knowledge and ability to make sound judgments on case processing and article review which were necessary for the proper performance of her duties.[13] Due to the nature and variety of these managerial functions, the best that Abbott could have done, at the time of Alcaraz's engagement, was to inform her of her duties and responsibilities, the adequate performance of which, to repeat, is an inherent and implied standard for regularization; this is unlike the circumstance in Aliling where a quantitative regularization standard, in the term of a sales quota, was readily articulable to the employee at the outset. Hence, since the reasonableness of Alcaraz's assessment clearly appears from the records, her termination was justified. Bear in mind that the quantum of proof which the employer must discharge is only substantial evidence which, as defined in case law, means that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.[14] To the Court's mind, this threshold of evidence Abbott amply overcame in this case.
	GR No. 178520 2009-06-23	AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE-EAST RIZAL v. ALLAN RAYMOND R. IGNACIO CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
And the quantum of proof which the employer must discharge is substantial evidence. An employee's dismissal due to serious misconduct must be supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. [30]
	GR NO. 158707 2006-11-27	COMMUNITY RURAL BANK OF SAN ISIDRO v. YSAGANI V. PAEZ AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In the present case, there is no dispute that respondent is not an ordinary rank-and-file employee. He was an OIC-Manager, reposed with managerial duties in overseeing petitioner's business. As a managerial employee, respondent was tasked to perform key and sensitive functions, and thus "bound by more exacting work ethics."[50] The position carried authority for the exercise of independent judgment and discretion characteristic of sensitive posts in corporate hierarchy where a wide latitude could be supposed in setting up stringent standards for continued employment.[51]
	GR NO. 164518 2006-01-25	INDUSTRIAL TIMBER CORPORATION v. VIRGILIO ABABON YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Also, the rule under Section 14 of Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC that a motion for reconsideration of any order, resolution or decision of the Commission shall not be entertained except when based on palpable or patent errors, provided that the motion is under oath and filed within 10 calendar days from receipt of the order, resolution or decision should not be interpreted as to sacrifice substantial justice to technicality. It should be borne in mind that the real purpose behind the limitation of the period is to forestall or avoid an unreasonable delay in the administration of justice, from which the NLRC absolved ITC and IPGC because the filing of their motion for reconsideration three days later than the prescribed period was due to excusable negligence. Indeed, the "Court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice requires it because what should guide judicial action is that a party is given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his action or defense rather than for him to lose life, honor, or property on mere technicalities."[27]