This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2014-07-28 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| True, an employer has the discretion to regulate all aspects of employment and the workers have the corresponding obligation to obey company rules and regulations. Deliberately disregarding or disobeying the rules cannot be countenanced, and any justification that the disobedient employee might put forth is deemed inconsequential.[20] However, the Court must emphasize that the prerogative of an employer to dismiss an employee on the ground of willful disobedience to company policies must be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of labor.[21] | |||||
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2010-07-02 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Moreover, the May 15, 2000 Order, in particular, could not have constituted the first notice relative to the charge that Cloma has incurred unauthorized absences for two days as stated in the notice of termination. This, inasmuch as the order refers to a four (4)-day absence supposedly incurred between May 12, 2000 and May 15, 2000 for which Cloma has actually been sanctioned with suspension. In this regard, it suffices to say that even assuming that the May 15, 2000 order could validly take the place of the first notice, still, Cloma's dismissal cannot be validly effected, because an employee may be dismissed only if the grounds mentioned in the pre-dismissal notice were the ones cited for the termination of employment.[29] The same is true with the third ground of termination, i.e., that Cloma has frequently been late in reporting for work. Observably, aside from the fact that Cloma, with respect to this ground, has not been furnished a pre-dismissal notice, the notice of termination does not state the inclusive dates on which Cloma actually reported late for his work. | |||||
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2007-09-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The twin requirements of (a) two notices and (b) hearing are necessary to protect the employee's security of tenure, which is enshrined in the Constitution, the Labor Code and related laws.[38] | |||||
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2005-12-13 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| That Maynilad suffered no damage resulting from the acts of petitioner is inconsequential. In Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. v. Nagkakaisang Empleyado ng Wellcome-DFA (NEW-DFA),[25] we held that deliberate disregard or disobedience of company rules could not be countenanced, and any justification that the disobedient employee might put forth would be deemed inconsequential. The lack of resulting damage was unimportant, because "the heart of the charge is the crooked and anarchic attitude of the employee towards his employer. Damage aggravates the charge but its absence does not mitigate nor negate the employee's liability."[26] What is abhorrent and punishable is the act of contracting unauthorized work for a fee, regardless of whether the act caused damage to the company. Thus, we hold that Maynilad validly terminated the services of petitioner on the ground of serious miconduct which resulted to the loss of trust of Maynilad upon petitioner because his credibility in doing his job as a team leader of a repair crew has already been eroded. | |||||