This case has been cited 7 times or more.
|
2013-01-30 |
PEREZ, J. |
||||
| The RTC's award of litigation expenses should likewise be deleted since, like attorney's fees, the award thereof requires that the reasons or grounds therefor must be set forth in the decision of the court.[34] This is particularly true in this case where the litigation expenses awarded were alternatively | |||||
|
2011-10-17 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
||||
| Neither is petitioner entitled to the award of attorney's fees. Jurisprudence requires that the factual basis for the award of attorney's fees must be set forth in the body of the decision and not in the dispositive portion only.[50] In this case, no explanation was given by the RTC in awarding attorney's fees in favor of petitioner. In fact, the award of attorney's fees was mentioned only in the dispositive portion of the decision. | |||||
|
2011-09-14 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
||||
| Article 2208[65] of the Civil Code enumerates the legal grounds which justify or warrant the grant of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, among which is when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest.[66] The reason for the award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses, however, must be set forth in the decision of the court and not in the dispositive portion only.[67] In this case, the factual and legal bases for the award were set forth in the body of the MTCC Decision dated June 2, 2003, to wit: x x x As the defendant refused to satisfy plaintiff's just and valid claim, the latter was compelled to litigate and engage the services of counsel to protect his interest and in the process, incurred litigation expenses.[68] | |||||
|
2009-05-08 |
TINGA, J. |
||||
| We sustain the amount of moral damages awarded to petitioner by the RTC. There is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral damages, since each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts, however, it must be commensurate to the loss or injury suffered.[28] Petitioner's original prayer for P5,000,000.00 for moral damages is excessive under the circumstances, and the amount awarded by the trial court of P500,000.00 in moral damages more seemly. | |||||
|
2008-11-20 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| Moreover, we cannot agree with PAL that the amount of moral damages awarded by the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, was excessive. In Mercury Drug Corporation v. Baking,[26] we had stated that "there is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral damages, since each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts. However, it must be commensurate to the loss or injury suffered."[27] Taking into account the attending circumstances here, we believe that the amount of P100,000 awarded as moral damages is appropriate. | |||||
|
2008-10-17 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
||||
| Mercury Drug and Ganzon can not exculpate themselves from any liability. As active players in the field of dispensing medicines to the public, the highest degree of care and diligence is expected of them.[73] Likewise, numerous decisions, both here and abroad, have laid salutary rules for the protection of human life and human health.[74] In the United States case of Tombari v. Conners,[75] it was ruled that the profession of pharmacy demands care and skill, and druggists must exercise care of a specially high degree, the highest degree of care known to practical men. In other words, druggists must exercise the highest practicable degree of prudence and vigilance, and the most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct of the business, so that human life may not constantly be exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicines.[76] | |||||
|
2008-02-04 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
||||
| There is no exact mathematical formula to determine proximate cause. It is based upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.[28] Plaintiff must, however, establish a sufficient link between the act or omission and the damage or injury. That link must not be remote or far-fetched; otherwise, no liability will attach. The damage or injury must be a natural and probable result of the act or omission. In the precedent-setting Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina,[29] this Court discussed the necessary link that must be established between the act or omission and the damage or injury, viz.: It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case and under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was very dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them; and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available, they had to use a torch, the most handy and available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the overturned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and was natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers' bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. The ruling in Bataclan has been repeatedly cited in subsequent cases as authority for the proposition that the damage or injury must be a natural or probable result of the act or omission. Here, We agree with the RTC that the damage caused to the Nissan van was a natural and probable result of the improper parking of the prime mover with trailer. As discussed, the skewed parking of the prime mover posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. Limbaga failed to prevent or minimize that risk. The skewed parking of the prime mover triggered the series of events that led to the collision, particularly the swerving of the passenger bus and the Nissan van. | |||||