This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2012-07-17 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.[32] It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say.[33] Verba legis non est recedendum from the words of a statute there should be no departure.[34] | |||||
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2011-08-24 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| A cursory reading shows that Section 3(i) covers the construction of "works across, or otherwise, any stream, watercourse, canal, ditch, flume, street, avenue, highway or railway of private and public ownership, as the location of said works may require." It is notable that Section 3(i) includes no limitation except those enumerated after the term works. Accordingly, we consider the term works as embracing all kinds of constructions, facilities, and other developments that can enable or help NPC to meet its objectives of developing hydraulic power expressly provided under paragraph (g) of Section 3.[23] The CA's restrictive construal of Section 3(i) as exclusive of tunnels was obviously unwarranted, for the provision applies not only to development works easily discoverable or on the surface of the earth but also to subterranean works like tunnels. Such interpretation accords with the fundamental guideline in statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, so must we not.[24] Moreover, when the language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning, that meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Congress intended to convey.[25] | |||||
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2007-02-16 |
CORONA, J. |
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| In RA 7653, only a "report of the head of the supervising or examining department" is necessary. It is an established rule in statutory construction that where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation:[24] | |||||
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2006-07-14 |
CORONA, J. |
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| The foregoing were judicial admissions which were conclusive on the municipality, the party making them.[10] Respondent municipality thus could not find solace in the legal maxim of ejusdem generis[11] which means "of the same kind, class or nature." Under this maxim, where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the general words will apply only to persons or things of the same general nature or class as those enumerated.[12] Instead, what applied in this case was the legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius which means that the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of others.[13] Hence, because of the distinct and definite meanings alluded to the two terms by the zoning ordinance, respondents could not insist that "gasoline service station" under Section 44 necessarily included "gasoline filling station" under Section 21. Indeed, the activities undertaken in a "gas service station" did not automatically embrace those in a "gas filling station." | |||||