This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2013-02-19 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| In Funa v. Ermita,[5] the Court resolved a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus brought by herein petitioner assailing the constitutionality of the designation of then Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) Maria Elena H. Bautista as concurrently the Officer-in-Charge of the Maritime Industry Authority. The petitioner has adopted here the arguments he advanced in Funa v. Ermita, and he has rested his grounds of challenge mainly on the pronouncements in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary[6] and Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma.[7] | |||||
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2013-01-21 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Incidentally, on July 16, 2009, the Company filed a Manifestation[15] informing this Court that its stockholders and directors unanimously voted to shorten the Company's corporate existence only until June 30, 2006, and that the three-year period allowed by law for liquidation of the Company's affairs already expired on June 30, 2009. Referring to Gelano v. Court of Appeals,[16] Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma,[17] and Atienza v. Villarosa,[18] it urged Us, however, to still resolve the case for future guidance of the bench and the bar as the issue raised herein allegedly calls for a clarification of a legal principle, specifically, whether the VA is empowered to rule on a matter not covered by the issue submitted for arbitration. | |||||
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2011-11-22 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| A case in point is the concurrent appointment of Magdangal B. Elma (Elma) as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) which was declared unconstitutional by this Court in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma.[13] In said case, this Court ruled that the concurrent appointment of Elma to these offices is in violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, since these are incompatible offices. Notably, the appointment of Elma as Chairman of the PCGG and as CPLC is, without a question, an executive act. Prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality of the said executive act, certain acts or transactions were made in good faith and in reliance of the appointment of Elma which cannot just be set aside or invalidated by its subsequent invalidation. | |||||
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2010-02-11 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| Union v. Executive Secretary,[5] and reiterated in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma.[6] He points out that while it was clarified in Civil Liberties Union that the prohibition does not apply to those positions held in ex-officio capacities, the position of MARINA Administrator is not ex-officio to the post of DOTC Undersecretary, as can be gleaned from the provisions of its charter, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 474,[7] as amended by Executive Order (EO) No. 125-A.[8] Moreover, the provisions on the DOTC in the Administrative Code of 1987, specifically Sections 23 and 24, Chapter 6, Title XV, Book IV do not provide any ex-officio role for the undersecretaries in any of the department's attached agencies. The fact that Bautista was extended an appointment naming her as OIC of MARINA shows that she does not occupy it in an ex-officio capacity since an ex-officio position does not require any "further warrant or appoint."[9] | |||||
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2010-02-11 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.[24] However, as we held in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma,[25] supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and public.[26] | |||||
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2010-02-11 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| Petitioner further contends that even if Bautista's appointment or designation as OIC of MARINA was intended to be merely temporary, still, such designation must not violate a standing constitutional prohibition, citing the rationale in Achacoso v. Macaraig.[10] Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not enumerate temporariness as one (1) of the exceptions thereto. And since a temporary designation does not have a maximum duration, it can go on for months or years. In effect, the temporary appointment/designation can effectively circumvent the prohibition. Allowing undersecretaries or assistant secretaries to occupy other government posts would open a Pandora's Box as to let them feast on choice government positions. Thus, in case of vacancy where no permanent appointment could as yet be made, the remedy would be to designate one (1) of the two (2) Deputy Administrators as the Acting Administrator. Such would be the logical course, the said officers being in a better position in terms of knowledge and experience to run the agency in a temporary capacity. Should none of them merit the President's confidence, then the practical remedy would be for Undersecretary Bautista to first resign as Undersecretary in order to qualify her as Administrator of MARINA. As to whether she in fact does not receive or has waived any remuneration, the same does not matter because remuneration is not an element in determining whether there has been a violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.[11] | |||||
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2009-07-15 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Just like the Local Water Districts, the PNRC was created through a special charter. However, unlike the Local Water Districts, the elements of government ownership and control are clearly lacking in the PNRC. Thus, although the PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be considered a government-owned or controlled corporation in the absence of the essential elements of ownership and control by the government. In creating the PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a private corporation. However, the constitutional prohibition against the creation of private corporations by special charters provides no exception even for non-profit or charitable corporations. Consequently, the PNRC Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and grants it corporate powers,[27] is void for being unconstitutional. Thus, Sections 1,[28] 2,[29] 3,[30] 4(a),[31] 5,[32] 6,[33] 7,[34] 8,[35] 9,[36] 10,[37] 11,[38] 12,[39] and 13[40] of the PNRC Charter, as amended, are void. | |||||
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2008-07-30 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| [32] G.R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 53. | |||||