Lawyerly

GR No. 196597

2015-10-21

MODESTO W. RIVERA v. ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

Law and jurisprudence have long recognized the right of employers to dismiss employees by reason of loss of trust and confidence.[20] More so, in the case of supervisors or personnel occupying positions of responsibility, loss of trust justifies termination. Loss of confidence as a just cause for dismissal is premised on the fact that an employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence.[21]

GR No. 158583

2014-09-10

ROSALIE L. GARGOLES v. REYLITA S. DEL ROSARIO

BERSAMIN, J.

The argument is untenable. It is true that every person is entitled to be presumed innocent of wrongdoing. The objective of the presumption has been to lay the burden of proof on the shoulders of the alleger of wrongdoing. The presumption extends to the petitioner and to every other employee charged with any wrongdoing that may cause them to be sanctioned, including being dismissed from employment. But the presumption, which is disputable, by no means excuses the employee charged with wrongdoing from answering and defending herself once the presumption has been overcome by a showing to the contrary. The failure of the employee to rebut or disprove the proof of wrongdoing then establishes the charge against her.[12] This is especially true in a case for dismissal grounded on loss of confidence or breach of trust, in which the employer may proceed to dismiss the erring employee once the employer becomes morally convinced that she was guilty of a breach of trust and confidence.[13] Based on the record, the petitioner did not sufficiently contradict or rebut the charge of dishonesty.

GR No. 162021

2014-06-16

MEGA MAGAZINE PUBLICATIONS v. MARGARET A. DEFENSOR

BERSAMIN, J.

We start by observing that the degree of proof required in labor cases is not as stringent as in other types of cases.[36] This liberal approach affords to the employee every opportunity to level the playing field in which her employer is pitted against her. Here, on the one hand, were Tabingo's memorandum and affidavit indicating that MMPI's revenues in 1999 totaled P36,216,624.07, and, on the other, the audit report showing MMPI's gross revenues amounting to only P31,947,677.00 in the same year. That the audit report was rendered by the auditing firm of Punongbayan & Araullo did not make it weightier than Tabingo's memorandum and affidavit, for only substantial evidence that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion[37] - was required in labor adjudication. Moreover, whenever the evidence presented by the employer and that by the employee are in equipoise, the scales of justice must tilt in favor of the latter.[38] For purposes of determining whether or not the petitioners' gross revenue reached the minimum target of P35 million, therefore, Tabingo's memorandum and affidavit sufficed to positively establish that it did, particularly considering that Tabingo's memorandum was made in the course of the performance of her official tasks as a traffic clerk of MMPI. In her affidavit, too, Tabingo asserted that her issuance of the memorandum was pursuant to MMPI's year-end procedures, an assertion that the petitioners did not refute. In any event, Tabingo's categorical declaration in her affidavit that "[because] of that achievement, as part of the Sales and Traffic Team of MMPI, in addition to my other bonuses that year, I received P8,500.00 in gift certificates as my share in the Group Incentive for the Sales and Traffic Team for gross advertising revenue of P35 to P38 million xxx,"[39] aside from the petitioners not refuting it, was corroborated by the 1999 Advertising Target sent by the respondent to Yap on December 2, 1999, in which the respondent reported a gross revenue of P36,216,624.07 as of December 1, 1999.[40]

GR No. 184520

2013-03-13

ROLANDO DS. TORRES v. RURAL BANK OF SAN JUAN

REYES, J.

Being a managerial employee, the petitioner is not entitled to 13th month pay. Pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 28, as implemented by the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law dated November 16, 1987, managerial employees are exempt from receiving such benefit without prejudice to the granting of other bonuses, in lieu of the 13th month pay, to managerial employees upon the employer's discretion.[53]

GR No. 174893

2012-07-11

FLORDELIZA MARIA REYES RAYEL v. PHILIPPINE LUEN THAI HOLDINGS

DEL CASTILLO, J.

Second, the affidavits of petitioner's co-workers revealed her negative attitude and unprofessional behavior towards them and the company. In her affidavit,[41] Agnes Suzette Pasustento, L&T's Manager for the Corporate Communications Department, attested to petitioner's "badmouthing" of Sauceda in one of their meetings abroad and of discussing with her about filing a labor case against the company. Also, in the affidavits of Rizza S. Esplana[42] (Sauceda's Executive Assistant), Cynthia Yñiguez[43] (Corporate Human Resources Manager of an affiliate of L&T), and Ana Wilma Arreza[44] (Human Resources and Administration Division Manager of an affiliate of L&T), they narrated several instances which demonstrated petitioner's notoriously bad temper. They all described her to have an "irrational" behavior and "superior and condescending" attitude in the workplace. Unfortunately for petitioner, these sworn statements which notably remain uncontroverted and unrefuted, militate against her innocence and strengthen the adverse averments against her.[45] It is well to state that as a CHR Director tasked to efficiently manage the company's human resource team and practically being considered the "face" of the Human Resource, petitioner should exhibit utmost concern for her employer's interest. She should likewise establish not only credibility but also respect from co-workers which can only be attained if she demonstrates maturity and professionalism in the discharge of her duties. She is also expected to act as a role model who displays uprightness both in her own behavior and in her dealings with others.

GR No. 176671

2012-06-20

APO CEMENT CORPORATION v. ZALDY E. BAPTISMA

DEL CASTILLO, J.

All told, we find that the testimony of Lobitaña constitutes substantial evidence to prove that respondent, as the then Power Plant Manager, accepted commissions and/or "kickbacks" from suppliers, which is a clear violation of Section 2.04 of petitioner's Company Rules and Regulations. Jurisprudence consistently holds that for managerial employees "the mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal." [60] As we then see it, respondent's termination was for a just and valid cause.

GR No. 193978

2012-02-28

JELBERT B. GALICTO v. H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III

BRION, J.

As such, this petition must necessar[ily] fail, as this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.[18]

GR No. 166199

2009-04-24

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. CHRISTOPHER KORUGA

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

In House of Sara Lee v. Rey,[29] the Court held that while, as a general rule, the factual findings of administrative agencies are not subject to review, it is equally established that the Court will not uphold erroneous conclusions which are contrary to evidence, because the agency a quo, for that reason, would be guilty of a grave abuse of discretion.

GR No. 176219

2008-12-23

RENTOKIL PHILIPPINES v. LEILANI D. SANCHEZ

TINGA, J.

It is a well-settled rule that the findings of facts of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are accorded great respect and, at times, even finality. There are, however, exceptions, among which is when there is a conflict between the factual findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter.[15] Accordingly, this Court must of necessity review the records to determine which findings should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts.[16] Nor is this Court bound by conclusions which are not supported by substantial evidence. The substantial evidence rule does not authorize any finding just as long as there is any evidence to support it. It does not excuse administrative agencies from considering contrary evidence which fairly detracts from the evidence supporting a finding.[17]

GR No. 176219

2008-12-23

RENTOKIL PHILIPPINES v. LEILANI D. SANCHEZ

TINGA, J.

There is no doubt that respondent's continuance in the sensitive fiduciary position of financial controller would be patently inimical to the interests of petitioner. It would be oppressive and unjust to order petitioner to take her back, for the law in protecting the rights of the employee authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.[30]

GR No. 164824

2008-04-30

ROLANDO V. AROMIN v. NLRC

VELASCO JR., J.

Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations Commission teaches that an employee validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or that which reflects adversely on the employee's moral character may be given financial assistance or severance pay.[33] Of similar tenor is Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. National Labor Relations Commission[34] where the Court, after a brief overview of relevant cases[35] dealing with the termination for any valid ground under Art. 282 of the Labor Code and where separation pay was not allowed, wrote:In all of the foregoing situations, the Court declined to grant termination pay because the causes for dismissal recognized under Art. 282 of the Labor Code were serious or grave in nature and attended by willful or wrongful intent or they reflected adversely on the moral character of the employees. We therefore find that in addition to serious misconduct, in dismissals based on other grounds under Art. 282 like willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of trust, and commission of a crime against the employer or his family, separation pay should not be conceded to the dismissed employee. (Emphasis ours.)

GR NOS. 158786 & 158789

2007-10-19

TOYOTA MOTOR PHILS. CORP. WORKERS ASSOCIATION v. NLRC

VELASCO, JR., J.

A recall of recent cases decided bearing on the issue reveals that when the termination is legally justified on any of the grounds under Art. 282, separation pay was not allowed. In Ha Yuan Restaurant v. NLRC,[68] we deleted the award of separation pay to an employee who, while unprovoked, hit her co-worker's face, causing injuries, which then resulted in a series of fights and scuffles between them. We viewed her act as serious misconduct which did not warrant the award of separation pay. In House of Sara Lee v. Rey,[69] this Court deleted the award of separation pay to a branch supervisor who regularly, without authorization, extended the payment deadlines of the company's sales agents. Since the cause for the supervisor's dismissal involved her integrity (which can be considered as breach of trust), she was not worthy of compassion as to deserve separation pay based on her length of service. In Gustilo v. Wyeth Phils., Inc.,[70] this Court found no exceptional circumstance to warrant the grant of financial assistance to an employee who repeatedly violated the company's disciplinary rules and regulations and whose employment was thus terminated for gross and habitual neglect of his duties. In the doctrinal case of San Miguel v. Lao,[71] this Court reversed and set aside the ruling of the CA granting retirement benefits or separation pay to an employee who was dismissed for willful breach of trust and confidence by causing the delivery of raw materials, which are needed for its glass production plant, to its competitor. While a review of the case reports does not reveal a case involving a termination by reason of the commission of a crime against the employer or his/her family which dealt with the issue of separation pay, it would be adding insult to injury if the employer would still be compelled to shell out money to the offender after the harm done.

	GR No. 196597 2015-10-21	MODESTO W. RIVERA v. ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Law and jurisprudence have long recognized the right of employers to dismiss employees by reason of loss of trust and confidence.[20] More so, in the case of supervisors or personnel occupying positions of responsibility, loss of trust justifies termination. Loss of confidence as a just cause for dismissal is premised on the fact that an employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence.[21]
	GR No. 158583 2014-09-10	ROSALIE L. GARGOLES v. REYLITA S. DEL ROSARIO BERSAMIN, J.
The argument is untenable. It is true that every person is entitled to be presumed innocent of wrongdoing. The objective of the presumption has been to lay the burden of proof on the shoulders of the alleger of wrongdoing. The presumption extends to the petitioner and to every other employee charged with any wrongdoing that may cause them to be sanctioned, including being dismissed from employment. But the presumption, which is disputable, by no means excuses the employee charged with wrongdoing from answering and defending herself once the presumption has been overcome by a showing to the contrary. The failure of the employee to rebut or disprove the proof of wrongdoing then establishes the charge against her.[12] This is especially true in a case for dismissal grounded on loss of confidence or breach of trust, in which the employer may proceed to dismiss the erring employee once the employer becomes morally convinced that she was guilty of a breach of trust and confidence.[13] Based on the record, the petitioner did not sufficiently contradict or rebut the charge of dishonesty.
	GR No. 162021 2014-06-16	MEGA MAGAZINE PUBLICATIONS v. MARGARET A. DEFENSOR BERSAMIN, J.
We start by observing that the degree of proof required in labor cases is not as stringent as in other types of cases.[36] This liberal approach affords to the employee every opportunity to level the playing field in which her employer is pitted against her. Here, on the one hand, were Tabingo's memorandum and affidavit indicating that MMPI's revenues in 1999 totaled P36,216,624.07, and, on the other, the audit report showing MMPI's gross revenues amounting to only P31,947,677.00 in the same year. That the audit report was rendered by the auditing firm of Punongbayan & Araullo did not make it weightier than Tabingo's memorandum and affidavit, for only substantial evidence that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion[37] - was required in labor adjudication. Moreover, whenever the evidence presented by the employer and that by the employee are in equipoise, the scales of justice must tilt in favor of the latter.[38] For purposes of determining whether or not the petitioners' gross revenue reached the minimum target of P35 million, therefore, Tabingo's memorandum and affidavit sufficed to positively establish that it did, particularly considering that Tabingo's memorandum was made in the course of the performance of her official tasks as a traffic clerk of MMPI. In her affidavit, too, Tabingo asserted that her issuance of the memorandum was pursuant to MMPI's year-end procedures, an assertion that the petitioners did not refute. In any event, Tabingo's categorical declaration in her affidavit that "[because] of that achievement, as part of the Sales and Traffic Team of MMPI, in addition to my other bonuses that year, I received P8,500.00 in gift certificates as my share in the Group Incentive for the Sales and Traffic Team for gross advertising revenue of P35 to P38 million xxx,"[39] aside from the petitioners not refuting it, was corroborated by the 1999 Advertising Target sent by the respondent to Yap on December 2, 1999, in which the respondent reported a gross revenue of P36,216,624.07 as of December 1, 1999.[40]
	GR No. 184520 2013-03-13	ROLANDO DS. TORRES v. RURAL BANK OF SAN JUAN REYES, J.
Being a managerial employee, the petitioner is not entitled to 13th month pay. Pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 28, as implemented by the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law dated November 16, 1987, managerial employees are exempt from receiving such benefit without prejudice to the granting of other bonuses, in lieu of the 13th month pay, to managerial employees upon the employer's discretion.[53]
	GR No. 174893 2012-07-11	FLORDELIZA MARIA REYES RAYEL v. PHILIPPINE LUEN THAI HOLDINGS DEL CASTILLO, J.
Second, the affidavits of petitioner's co-workers revealed her negative attitude and unprofessional behavior towards them and the company. In her affidavit,[41] Agnes Suzette Pasustento, L&T's Manager for the Corporate Communications Department, attested to petitioner's "badmouthing" of Sauceda in one of their meetings abroad and of discussing with her about filing a labor case against the company. Also, in the affidavits of Rizza S. Esplana[42] (Sauceda's Executive Assistant), Cynthia Yñiguez[43] (Corporate Human Resources Manager of an affiliate of L&T), and Ana Wilma Arreza[44] (Human Resources and Administration Division Manager of an affiliate of L&T), they narrated several instances which demonstrated petitioner's notoriously bad temper. They all described her to have an "irrational" behavior and "superior and condescending" attitude in the workplace. Unfortunately for petitioner, these sworn statements which notably remain uncontroverted and unrefuted, militate against her innocence and strengthen the adverse averments against her.[45] It is well to state that as a CHR Director tasked to efficiently manage the company's human resource team and practically being considered the "face" of the Human Resource, petitioner should exhibit utmost concern for her employer's interest. She should likewise establish not only credibility but also respect from co-workers which can only be attained if she demonstrates maturity and professionalism in the discharge of her duties. She is also expected to act as a role model who displays uprightness both in her own behavior and in her dealings with others.
	GR No. 176671 2012-06-20	APO CEMENT CORPORATION v. ZALDY E. BAPTISMA DEL CASTILLO, J.
All told, we find that the testimony of Lobitaña constitutes substantial evidence to prove that respondent, as the then Power Plant Manager, accepted commissions and/or "kickbacks" from suppliers, which is a clear violation of Section 2.04 of petitioner's Company Rules and Regulations. Jurisprudence consistently holds that for managerial employees "the mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal." [60] As we then see it, respondent's termination was for a just and valid cause.
	GR No. 193978 2012-02-28	JELBERT B. GALICTO v. H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III BRION, J.
As such, this petition must necessar[ily] fail, as this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.[18]
	GR No. 166199 2009-04-24	SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. CHRISTOPHER KORUGA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In House of Sara Lee v. Rey,[29] the Court held that while, as a general rule, the factual findings of administrative agencies are not subject to review, it is equally established that the Court will not uphold erroneous conclusions which are contrary to evidence, because the agency a quo, for that reason, would be guilty of a grave abuse of discretion.
	GR No. 176219 2008-12-23	RENTOKIL PHILIPPINES v. LEILANI D. SANCHEZ TINGA, J.
It is a well-settled rule that the findings of facts of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are accorded great respect and, at times, even finality. There are, however, exceptions, among which is when there is a conflict between the factual findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter.[15] Accordingly, this Court must of necessity review the records to determine which findings should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts.[16] Nor is this Court bound by conclusions which are not supported by substantial evidence. The substantial evidence rule does not authorize any finding just as long as there is any evidence to support it. It does not excuse administrative agencies from considering contrary evidence which fairly detracts from the evidence supporting a finding.[17]
	GR No. 176219 2008-12-23	RENTOKIL PHILIPPINES v. LEILANI D. SANCHEZ TINGA, J.
There is no doubt that respondent's continuance in the sensitive fiduciary position of financial controller would be patently inimical to the interests of petitioner. It would be oppressive and unjust to order petitioner to take her back, for the law in protecting the rights of the employee authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.[30]
	GR No. 164824 2008-04-30	ROLANDO V. AROMIN v. NLRC VELASCO JR., J.
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations Commission teaches that an employee validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or that which reflects adversely on the employee's moral character may be given financial assistance or severance pay.[33] Of similar tenor is Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. National Labor Relations Commission[34] where the Court, after a brief overview of relevant cases[35] dealing with the termination for any valid ground under Art. 282 of the Labor Code and where separation pay was not allowed, wrote:In all of the foregoing situations, the Court declined to grant termination pay because the causes for dismissal recognized under Art. 282 of the Labor Code were serious or grave in nature and attended by willful or wrongful intent or they reflected adversely on the moral character of the employees. We therefore find that in addition to serious misconduct, in dismissals based on other grounds under Art. 282 like willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of trust, and commission of a crime against the employer or his family, separation pay should not be conceded to the dismissed employee. (Emphasis ours.)
	GR NOS. 158786 & 158789 2007-10-19	TOYOTA MOTOR PHILS. CORP. WORKERS ASSOCIATION v. NLRC VELASCO, JR., J.
A recall of recent cases decided bearing on the issue reveals that when the termination is legally justified on any of the grounds under Art. 282, separation pay was not allowed. In Ha Yuan Restaurant v. NLRC,[68] we deleted the award of separation pay to an employee who, while unprovoked, hit her co-worker's face, causing injuries, which then resulted in a series of fights and scuffles between them. We viewed her act as serious misconduct which did not warrant the award of separation pay. In House of Sara Lee v. Rey,[69] this Court deleted the award of separation pay to a branch supervisor who regularly, without authorization, extended the payment deadlines of the company's sales agents. Since the cause for the supervisor's dismissal involved her integrity (which can be considered as breach of trust), she was not worthy of compassion as to deserve separation pay based on her length of service. In Gustilo v. Wyeth Phils., Inc.,[70] this Court found no exceptional circumstance to warrant the grant of financial assistance to an employee who repeatedly violated the company's disciplinary rules and regulations and whose employment was thus terminated for gross and habitual neglect of his duties. In the doctrinal case of San Miguel v. Lao,[71] this Court reversed and set aside the ruling of the CA granting retirement benefits or separation pay to an employee who was dismissed for willful breach of trust and confidence by causing the delivery of raw materials, which are needed for its glass production plant, to its competitor. While a review of the case reports does not reveal a case involving a termination by reason of the commission of a crime against the employer or his/her family which dealt with the issue of separation pay, it would be adding insult to injury if the employer would still be compelled to shell out money to the offender after the harm done.

HOUSE OF SARA LEE v. CYNTHIA F. REY