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PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK v. ANASTACIO D. ABAD

This case has been cited 7 times or more.

	GR No. 172293 2013-08-28	ARACELI J. CABRERA v. ANGELA G. FRANCISCO DEL CASTILLO, J.
As pointed out by respondents, petitioners failed to question in their Motion for Reconsideration before the CA its affirmance of the RTC's findings that the Complaint states no cause of action and that Araceli and Arnel have no authority to sue in behalf of the other heirs of Severino. Suffice it to say that "[p]rior to raising [these arguments] before this Court, [they] should have raised the matter in [their Motion for Reconsideration] in order to give the appellate court an opportunity to correct its ruling. For [them] to raise [these issues] before [this Court] now would be improper, since [they] failed to do so before the CA."[44]
	GR No. 164939 2011-06-06	SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT v. VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR BUENAVENTURA C. MAGSALIN VILLARAMA, JR., J.
In deleting the award of financial assistance to Caragdag, the CA cited the case of Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Abad,[23] which held that the grant of separation pay or other financial assistance to an employee dismissed for just cause is based on equity and is a measure of social justice, awarded to an employee who has been validly dismissed if the dismissal was not due to serious misconduct or causes that reflected adversely on the moral character of the employee. In this case, the CA agreed with the findings of the Voluntary Arbitrator that Caragdag was validly dismissed due to serious misconduct. Accordingly, financial assistance should not have been awarded to Caragdag. The CA also noted that it is the employer's prerogative to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary or proper for the conduct of its business or concern, to provide certain disciplinary measures to implement said rules and to ensure compliance therewith.
	GR No. 160302 2010-09-27	DANILO ESCARIO v. NLRC BERSAMIN, J.
Under the circumstances, the grant of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement of the petitioners was proper. It is not disputable that the grant of separation pay or some other financial assistance to an employee is based on equity, which has been defined as justice outside law, or as being ethical rather than jural and as belonging to the sphere of morals than of law.[30] This Court has granted separation pay as a measure of social justice even when an employee has been validly dismissed, as long as the dismissal has not been due to serious misconduct or reflective of personal integrity or morality.[31]
	GR No. 172724 2010-08-23	PHARMACIA v. RICARDO P. ALBAYDA PERALTA, J.
This Court, however, is not unmindful of previous rulings,[65] wherein separation pay has been granted to a validly dismissed employee after giving considerable weight to long years of employment.[66]
	GR No. 165951 2010-03-30	SOLIDBANK CORPORATION v. NLRC PERALTA, J.
As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 282[26] of the Labor Code is not entitled to separation pay.[27] Although by way of exception, the grant of separation pay or some other financial assistance may be allowed to an employee dismissed for just causes on the basis of equity.[28]
	GR No. 169712 2009-01-20	MA. WENELITA S. TIRAZONA v. PHILIPPINE EDS TECHNO- SERVICE INC. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Although by way of exception, the grant of separation pay or some other financial assistance may be allowed to an employee dismissed for just causes on the basis of equity,[15] in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations Commission,[16] we set the limits for such a grant and gave the following ratio for the same:[S]eparation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. x x x.
	GR NO. 147719 2006-01-27	HA YUAN RESTAURANT v. NLRC AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice. (Emphasis supplied) Separation pay therefore, depends on the cause of dismissal, and may be accordingly awarded provided that the dismissal does not fall under either of two circumstances: (1) there was serious misconduct, or (2) the dismissal reflected on the employee's moral character.[5]