This case has been cited 1 times or more.
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2008-09-19 |
BRION, J. |
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| We treat respondent Superada no differently. While his death intervened after the completion of the investigation, it has been settled that the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction over an administrative matter by the mere fact that the respondent public official ceases to hold office during the pendency of the respondent's case;[15] jurisdiction once acquired, continues to exist until the final resolution of the case.[16] In Layao, Jr. v. Caube,[17] we held that the death of the respondent in an administrative case does not preclude a finding of administrative liability: This jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complainant was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent public official innocent of the charges or declared him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications ... If innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation. The above rule is not without exceptions, as we explained in the case of Limliman v. Judge Ulat-Marrero,[18] where we said that death of the respondent necessitates the dismissal of the administrative case upon a consideration of any of the following factors: first, the observance of respondent's right to due process;[19] second, the presence of exceptional circumstances in the case on the grounds of equitable and humanitarian reasons;[20] and third, it may also depend on the kind of penalty imposed.[21] None of these exceptional considerations are present in the case. | |||||