Lawyerly

You're currently signed in as:
User

REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN

This case has been cited 4 times or more.

	GR Nos. 172476-99 2010-09-15	BRIG. GEN. JOSE RAMISCAL v. SANDIGANBAYAN CARPIO, J.
We remind respondent to abide by this Court's ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,[37] where we stated that the mere filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not by itself merit a suspension of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the Sandiganbayan. Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court so provides: Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. - The court in which the petition [for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus] is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case. (Emphasis supplied)
	GR No. 181970 2010-08-03	BERNARDO DE LEON v. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY SUBSTITUTED BY CITY OF PARAÑAQUE PERALTA, J.
As to whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding in abeyance the resolution of PEA's Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition, Section 7,[32] Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides the general rule that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court or court of origin does not stay the proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. It is true that there are instances where, even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order issued by a higher court, it would be proper for a lower court or court of origin to suspend its proceedings on the precept of judicial courtesy.[33] The principle of judicial courtesy, however, remains to be the exception rather than the rule. As held by this Court in Go v. Abrogar,[34] the precept of judicial courtesy should not be applied indiscriminately and haphazardly if we are to maintain the relevance of Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
	GR No. 175371 2008-04-30	BENITO J. BRIZUELA v. ABRAHAM DINGLE CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Given the foregoing, the Court of Appeals correctly denied petitioner's application since there is a marked absence of any urgent necessity for the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction.[38] Hence, the Court of Appeals could not have committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its Resolution dated 3 May 2006. It is a rule well-settled that for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power.[39] There is none in this case.
	GR NO. 167103 2006-08-31	MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA v. SANDIGANBAYAN TINGA, J.
A final note. The Court reiterates its pronouncement in Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), et al.[23] that in cases where the Sandiganbayan's interlocutory orders are challenged before this Court, the Sandiganbayan should continue, not suspend, proceedings before it where no temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is issued by this Court and there is an absence of a strong probability that the issues raised before this Court would be rendered moot by the continuation of the proceedings.